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The purpose of the study was to investigate the role of donors in the establishment,
implementation and sustainability of donor-funded telecentres in Africa. This was
achieved by looking at success factors and reasons of failure at three donor-funded
telecentres across three countries on the continent. The projects in question were
Nakaseke Telecentre in Uganda, Bhamshela Telecentre in South Africa and the
Malawi Rural Telecentre Project (MRTP) which, in the end, was never implemented
in Malawi. To achieve the objectives of the study, both secondary and primary
sources of data were used. The population of the study consisted of senior officers
within the organisations that pledged financial and technical support for the MRTP
and those that funded the Bhamshela and Nakaseke Telecentres. However, since there
was no response from the donors of the Nakaseke Telecentre, all the data relating to
the case was solely sourced from the literature (both print and on-line). Data collected
dealt with various aspects of telecentre establishment, implementation and
sustainability.
The study found that Africa depends heavily on external finance and expertise to
establish and implement telecentres due to financial incapacity, lack of expertise and
poor infrastructure. The various experiences from the three cases have also
demonstrated that donors cannot apply a single model of implementation uniformly
across the region due to various political and socio-economic factors existing in
different areas of the continent. Finally, the study highlighted the fact that if project
sustainability is to be achieved, donors need to constantly improve the training and
management component of telecentres. Therefore, rather than trying to draw a
standard blueprint for project success, donors need to be ingenious and learn from
shared experiences in the field, creatively adapting the solutions that work in one
context to others.
In conclusion, the findings identified in the present study potentially open up a




• My most sincere and heartfelt gratitude go to my thesis supervisor, Mr. Athol
Leach, of the Information Studies Programme, University of KwaZulu-Natal,
Pietermaritzburg, for his untiring guidance and constant encouragement
throughout my research. His professional supervision and constructive
suggestions, have without a doubt, helped me to organize and write this thesis.
I am also grateful to Professor Christine Stilwell, Head of the Programme, for
her varied support especially at the early stages of my research.
• To my dear wife Ethel and beloved daughter Anne, who have been very
supportive throughout the entire period of my research writing and revision, I
say thank you. My thanks also go to close friends, more especially Irikidzai
Manase, who generously proof read the draft copy of this thesis. My special
thanks go to my parents William and Anne Chisa for bringing me up,
supporting and encouraging me in my studies right from the early stages of my
life.
• Lastly, but not least, I am very grateful to Mrs. Annette le Roux, my
immediate supervisor at the Evangelical Seminary of Southern Africa where I
am currently working, for her unflinching support and constant words of
encouragement while this thesis was being reviewed. May the Lord continue
to bless you all.
III
Dedication
This thesis is dedicated to the following people: My parents William and Anne, my
wife Ethel, my daughter Anne and all my brothers and sisters both living and
deceased. These have all been a source of inspiration and encouragement to me, each
in his or her special way. The thesis is also dedicated to all the digitally divided







Table of contents............................................................................ V
List of tables. . . . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. . . .. . . . . .. .. . . .. . . . .. . .. . .. . .... x
List of figures. . . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . . .. . . . ... . . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . .. .. Xl
List of appendices. .. . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. .. . . ... . ... . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . . . .. .. . .. . . .. . Xll
List of acronyms.......................................................................... XliI
Chapter 1: Introduction to the study
1.1 Introduction. .. .. . . . .. . .. . . . .. 1
1.2 Definition of key terms. . . . .. . .. .. . .. . ... . .. .. . .. . .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . .. .. . . .. . 2
1.3 The importance of telecentres for rural areas in Africa: an overview 4
1.4 Research problem 7
1.4.1 Purpose of the study 8
1.4.2 Research objectives 8
1.4.3 Research questions 9
1.5 Justification for the study 9
1.6 Methodology l 0
1.7 Context of the case studies 10
1.7.1 Nakaseke Multipurpose Community Telecentre (Uganda) 11
1.7.2 Bhamshela Telecentre (South Africa) 15
1.7.3 The Malawi Rural Telecentre Project 20
1.8 Scope and limitations of the study 24
1.9 Outline of the remainder of the thesis .24
V
1.10 Summary 25
Chapter 2: Review of the literature
2.1 Introduction 26
2.2 Donor aid: its historical origins 26
2.2.1 Donor aid and national policy in Africa 27
2.2.2 The conditionality of national policy to donor aid 28
2.2.3 Selectivity 30
2.3 Background to telecentres in Africa 31
2.4 Telecentres and the Internet 32
2.5 Telecentre models 33
2.5.1 Private sector telecentres 34
2.5.2 Donor funded telecentres 36
2.6 Origins of donor funded telecentre projects in Africa 37
2.7 Benefits oftelecentres to rural communities 38
2.7.1 Information service 38
2.7.2 E-commerce '" 39
2.7.3 Employment generation .40
2.7.4 Education and training .41
2.7.5 Health and medical information .42
2.7.6 Good governance .42
2.7.7 Social empowerment of women .43
2.8 The role of donors in telecentre projects .45
2.8.1 Role of donor policies in the management, ownership and
sustainability of telecentre projects .46
2.8.2 Role of donors in the scale of the telecentre project.. .47
vi
2.8.3 Role of donors in telecentre evaluation .48
2.9 Summary 50
Chapter 3: Research design and methodology
3.1 Introduction 51
3.2 Exploratory research design 51
3.2.1 Case study approach 52
3.2.2 Criteria for selecting the cases 53
3.3 Research population 54
3.4 Data collection methods 55
3.4.1 Face-to-face interviews 56
3.4.2 E-mail questionnaire 57
3.5 Actual data collection 59
3.6 Data analysis procedures 59
3.7 Evaluation of the research methodology 60
3.8 Summary 61
Chapter 4: Presentation and discussion of results
4.1 Introduction 62
4.2 Presentation of results 63
4.2.1 Face-to-face interviews 63
4.2.1.1 Role of donors and local stakeholders in the MRTP 63
4.2.1.2 Non implementation of the MRTP 65
4.2.1.3 Lessons learned from the MRTP '" 67
4.2.1.4 Additional issues 68
4.2.2 An abridged version of the MRTP feasibility study results 69
vii
4.2.2.1 Malawi country status 69
4.2.2.2 The Malawi Rural Telecentre Project. 69
4.2.2.3 Telecommunications sector. 70
4.2.2.4 leT policies in Malawi 70
4.2.2.5 Key Issues 71
4.2.2.6 How success would be guaranteed 71
4.2.2.7 Relevant content. 71
4.2.2.8 Information services 72
4.2.2.9 Beneficiaries of the project. 72
4.2.3 E-mail questiolUlaire results 74
4.2.3.1 The role of the donors in the establishment of Bhamshela
Telecentre 74
4.2.3.2 The role of donors in the scope of Bhamshela telecentre 75
4.2.3.3 The role of donors in site identification 76
4.2.3.4 The role of the donors in preparing the community for the
project 78
4.2.3.5 The role of the donors in the identification and preparation
of champions , 79
4.2.3.6 Strategic partnerships 80
4.2.3.7 Any other issues 81
4.3 Status ofNakaseke Telecentre based on data from the literature 83
4.4 Analysis and comment 84
4.4.1 Role of donor policies on telecentre projects 84
4.4.2 The role of donors in community ownership and moulding of
local champions 86
4.4.3 Role of donors in ensuring project sustainability 88
VIII
4.4.3.1 Community awareness building 91
4.4.3.2 Choice of computer applications 92
4.4.3.3 The training oftelecentre staff and users 93
4.4.4 Collaborative local needs and skills assessment. 94
4.4.5 participatory monitoring and evaluation 95
4.5 Summary '" 96
Chapter 5: Conclusions and recommendations
5.1 Review of research purpose and objectives 97
5.2 Overview of the study 98
5.3 Key findings 99
5.4 Concluding remarks 100
5.5 Recommendations 101
5.6 Suggestions for further research 104




Table 1. Internet access by region
Table 2. User groups of the Nakaseke MCT in terms of gender
Table 3. User groups of the Nakaseke MCT in terms of age
Table 4. Selected African countries - Key ICT indicators (2001)








Figure 1. User groups of the Nakaseke MeT





Appendix A: Covering letter for the questionnaire 115
Appendix B: Letter of introduction from the supervisor 116
Appendix C: Email questionnaire 117
Appendix D: Interview schedule 120
Appendix E: Questions asked to local role players of the MRTP 121
Appendix F: Reminder email to an official representing USA 122





























African Information Society Initiative
Compact Disc Read Only Memory
Digital Video Decoder
Government Communication Information Services
Harnessing Information Technology for Development
Independent Broadcasting Authority
Independent Communication Authority of South Africa
Information Communication Technology
International Development Research Centre
International Monitory Fund
Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Program.
International Telecommunication Union
Learners with Special Educational Needs




Malawi Rural Telecentre Project
Malawi Telecommunications Limited
Overseas Education Fund

















United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific
United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organisation




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
A number of issues are discussed in this Chapter. Section 1.1 introduces the study.
Section 1.2 defines key concepts of the study in order to acquaint the reader with the
research. Section 1.3 briefly discusses why telecentres are important for rural areas. The
problem of the study and the research objectives and questions are discussed in Section
1.4. Section 1.5 provides the justification of the study while Section 1.6 lays out its
methodology. Section 1.7 then provides the background information regarding the three
case studies under review. Section 1.8 provides the scope and limitation of the study,
while the thesis outline is presented in Section 1.9. Section 1.10 concludes the Chapter.
1.1 Introduction
The primary strategic objective of donor-funded telecentres in Africa is to meet the
marginal and rural communities' huge demand for information and communication. This
demand is brought about by high levels of illiteracy, poverty and the slow and uneven
pace of development found in most of the continent's rural areas. Thus, the existing
donor-funded telecentres in Africa require appropriate support from donors and optimal
policy regulation from national governments to ensure their growth and evolution
(Molner and Karvalics 2002: 327; Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003: 170). This is evident
in various studies that were carried out to evaluate the operation of some telecentres. For
example, a 2003 study funded by the International Development Research Centre
(lDRC), examined the challenges around the setting up, operations, and the effects of 36
telecentres in 5 African countries. The study found that the general performance of these
telecentres was hardly encouraging and most of the centres were not likely to continue
operating into the future (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003: 151). Nevertheless, the
relative success of some of the telecentres, as noted in the study, is a clear indication that
telecentre initiatives can succeed under appropriate conditions. Etta and Parvyn-
Wamahiu (2003: 166-7) recommend that the minimum conditions that can ensure the
telecentres' success in Africa should be "ownership and management models different
from the common 'trustee' one that appears to be the most plagued by poor
performance". Donor-funded telecentres, the focus of this study, fall under the trusteeship
model referred to by the two researchers. The different te/ecentre models will be further
discussed in Chapter 2.
Thus, a number of questions pertaining to the role of donors in donor-funded telecentres
were raised in this study. The questions posed revolved around the role of donors in the
establishment, sustainability and the environment within which three donor-funded
telecentres arose in three African countries. The projects, which have, interestingly,
demonstrated different levels of success, are Nakaseke in Uganda, Bhamshela in South
Africa and the Malawi Rural Telecentre Project (MRTP) in Malawi, which was,
unfortunately, never implemented. While the main criteria used for selecting the
telecentres will be explained in Chapter 3 when describing the methodology of the study,
details concerning the telecentre projects themselves and the environment in which they
arose will be given later in this Chapter (see Section 1.7). However, before discussing the
background and context of the study and the research problem, it is necessary to define
key concepts used in the study. This is because the telecentre initiative is a relatively new
concept in Africa and, thus, terms and definitions are sometimes contested.
1.2 Definition of key terms
This section briefly defines important terms that are used repeatedly in the thesis. The
definition of key terms is necessary because it enables the reader to gain a clear
understanding of the nature of the research (Aitchson 1998: 6).
Donor
According to the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (Wehmeier 2000: 34), the term
"donor" refers to a person, an organisation or a country, which contributes something to a
cause. This definition of "donor" is broad and, therefore, can have a general application.
For the purposes of this study, however, a "donor" will refer to an organisation which
provides financial or technical support to African communities in their developmental
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endeavours in general but specifically In the establishment, implementation and
sustainability of rural telecentre projects.
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)
Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu (2003: 12), define ICTs as all "instruments, modes, and means
both old and new through which information and data are transmitted or communicated
from one person to another or from place to place". In terms of the present study, ICTs
win refer to such modern technologies as telephone, facsimile, video, television, radio
and computer-based or computer mediated modes (for example email, chat and news
groups, list serves, electronic conferencing and CD-ROMs) which may be found in
Multipurpose Community Telecentres (MCTs).
Telecentres
There is currently no single and generally accepted definition for the term "telecentre". A
number of different names are given to these facilities such as Telecottage (Europe),
Community Technology Center (US), MCT (Africa) and Public Internet Cabin (Cuba)
(Menou 2003: 631). For the purposes of this study, however, a telecentre is defined as:
An integrated information and communication facility that houses a combination
of both new and not-so-new ICTs (e.g., television, video, facsimile, telephone,
computers with Internet connectivity, and sometimes books). This type of facility
in which a number of different information and communication technologies are
housed and used in integrated manner is seen as the modern telecentre and is
called a multipurpose community telecentre (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003:
13).
Policy
The definition of "policy" is subject to debate amongst experts. However, Colebatch
(2002: 23) says that there are "vertical" and "horizontal" dimensions of policy and he
defines the vertical dimension of policy as a "rule... concerned with the transmission
downwards of authorized decisions". Policy in this regard encapsulates a top-down
relationship in which "authorized decision makers select courses of action which will
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maximize the values they hold, and transmit these to subordinate officials to implement"
(Colebatch 2002: 23). However, it is Colebatch's horizontal dimension of policy which
defines policy as "a process of structured interaction" that this study finds most helpful:
It is concerned with relationships among policy participants
in different organisations-that is outside of the line of hierarchical
authority. It recognises that policy work takes place across
organisational boundaries as well as within them, and consists in the
structure of understandings and commitments among participants in
different organisations as well as the hierarchical transmission of
authorised decisions within anyone organisation (Colebatch 2002: 23).
1.3 The importance of telecentres for rural areas in Africa: an overview
The uneven global distribution of access to ICTs, alluded to earlier in this Chapter, has
highlighted a digital divide that separates individuals who are able to gain access to ICTs
from those who have no opportunity of doing so (Chisenga 2001; Kiplang'at 2002: 347).
The United Nations (UN) in its statement on Universal Access to Basic Communication
and Information Services notes that:
The information and technology gap and related inequities between industrialized
and developing nations are widening: a new type of poverty, information poverty,
looms. Most developing countries, especially the least developing countries are
not sharing in the communications revolution ... (United Nations 1998).
The following statistics will serve to highlight the alarming differences at either end of
the digital divide:
• All the developing countries of the world own a mere 4% of the world computers.
• Tokyo alone has more telephones than the entire African continent.
• There are more Web hosts in New York than in continental Africa.
• 75% of the world's 700 million telephone sets can be found in the nine richest
countries.
• Out of the 605.60 million Internet users in the world, only 6.31 million (1.04%)
are in Africa.
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• South Africa accounts for 3,068,000 (48.62%) of the online users in Africa and its
Internet user community accounts for only 7.03% of the South African population
(Nua Internet survey 2004; Da Costa 2002: 41).
Similarly, Table 1 below shows the gap in Internet access between the industrialised and
developing worlds. More than 85 per cent of the world's Internet users are in developed
countries, which account for only about 22 per cent of the world's population (Nua
Internet survey 2004).
Table 1. Internet access by region
Region People connected Global percentage Percentage of
(Millions) of global population
People connected
Canada and 97.0 56.6 5.1
USA
Europe 40.1 23.4 13.7




Africa 6.3 1.1 12.9
Middle East 0.9 0.5 3.6
Latin America 5.3 5.3 8.4
Source: Nua Internet survey 2004
Unsurprisingly, this digital divide mirrors divides in other resources that have a more
insidious effect, for example, access to education, health care, capital, shelter,
employment, clean water and food (Harris 2001: 73). That is, the digital divide can be
seen more as an absence of access to information than as an absence of access to
technology. Harris (2001: 73) argues that these other divides should arguably be seen
more as the result of an imbalance in access to information than its cause. Arguably,
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information is critical to the social and economic activities that comprise the development
process. If information is critical to development, then ICTs, as a means of sharing
information, are a link in the chain of the development process itself(ILO 2001).
Thus, one of the answers to the problem of the digital divide on the continent has been
the introduction of donor-funded telecentres commonly known MCTs. According to
Harris (2001: 74), telecentres provide an alternative to the model of one-to-one individual
access to a computer that is common in the developed world. As community resources,
MCTs offer opportunities for development that are based on improved access to
information for whole communities. Since the mid 1990s, MCTs have been introduced in
many communities throughout Africa. A significant example is the IORC funded Acacia
Project that aims to empower Sub-Saharan African countries with the ability to apply
lCTs to their own social and economic development. Acacia works in Mocambique,
Senegal, South Africa and Uganda mainly with rural and disadvantaged communities,
which often find themselves isolated from the lCT networks which their urban
counterparts increasingly have access to (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003).
The introduction of a telecentre into a typical rural community in Africa represents a
substantial innovation for that community. For many rural dwellers in Africa, a telecentre
will be their first encounter with a computer. However, telecentres that seek to overcome
the barriers to accessing ICTs in rural areas in Africa are mostly experimental. Currently,
the impact of such centres in rural and remote areas has been minimal and there are many
questions that need to be answered before embarking on ambitious and costly
programmes at a national level (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003; Ernberg 1998).
Due to the novelty of access to ICTs and the shortage of guidelines for establishing and
implementing telecentres in Africa, many questions remain unanswered as to how this
innovation can bring about equitable and sustainable access to information resources
amongst the most disadvantaged sections of Africa's population. Underpinning the
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researcher's perspective on telecentres (and one which informs this study) is the view that
telecentres can, to a greater extent, bridge the digital divide and generate or support
development in disadvantaged rural areas (Snyrnan and Snyman 2003: I05). However, the
researcher is also aware that telecentres are not the only solution available for
communities to better their living conditions. In this regard, Menou's emphasis (in
Snyman and Snyman 2003: 105) that "the ICT aspect is only one amongst many other
instruments that a community could use in its development endeavours" is both
acknowledged and agreed with.
1.4 Research problem
The typology, sociology and politics of MCTs suggest that they are established and
operated to meet the needs of the "geographically disadvantaged, economically weak and
infrastructurally poor majority" (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003: 153). This group of
people is not only culturally and ethnically diverse but is also common all over the
continent. The first issue then is to determine the actual role of donors in the process of
establishing and implementing MCTs in such adverse conditions. It is evident from the
empirical studies, so far, that serious problems have plagued MCT services in Uganda,
South Africa, Senegal and Mali and many other countries in Africa (Benjamin 2000; Etta
and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003: 55,69,91,138).
Another important issue to note is that although donor assistance has acted as a seedbed
for the di ffusion of telecentres in Africa, future use and development wi 11 largely depend
on whether the donors themselves have embraced policies that guarantee the future
sustainability of these donor-funded telecentres. As will be seen later in Chapter 2, donor
support is always time bound and limited. Thus, the study intended to determine the role
of donors in creating a dynamic sustainability mechanism that would ensure continued
and effective service delivery after the termination of donor support. Based on the above-
mentioned observations, the study looked at the following issues:
• Telecentre context (technical, social, economic and political).
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• Telecentre establishment (conceptualisation, planning).
• Telecentre implementation (setting-up).
• Telecentre sustainability (ownership, management and evaluation).
These issues were addressed in this study with the intention to identify key areas of
success or failure in setting up sustainable MCTs on the continent and determining the
role of donors in the entire process.
1.4.1 Purpose of the study
This study presents the results of three case studies on three African countries where
MCTs were established. The study was an exploratory research contributing towards
"illuminating the situation of lCT and development in the continent" (Etta and Parvyn-
Wamahiu 2003: 5-6).
1.4.2 Research objectives
The objectives of this study were as follows:
a. To determine the role of donor policies in teJecentre projects in Africa by looking
at the key areas of success and reasons for failures (if any) of the three case
studies under review.
b. To explore whether donor-funded telecentres provide a sustainable way of
providing universal access to ICTs and determine the conditions that must be met
to make them sustainable.
c. To determine the extent to which the donor-funded telecentre model can engender
community ownership and the moulding of local champions.
d. To explore the dynamics of strategic partnerships between the project donors, the
project proposers and local community actors and assess how this collaboration,
or lack thereof, affects the management of the telecentre.
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e. Based on the findings of the study, to recommend key success factors for
sustainable donor-funded telecentres in Africa.
1.4.3 Research questions
Drawing on the above research objectives, the study asked the following questions:
a. What is the role of donor policies in telecentre projects in Africa specifically
in terms of the key areas of success and reasons for failures (if any) of the
three case studies?
b. How can donor-funded telecentres provide a sustainable way of providing
universal access to ICTs and what are the conditions that must be met to make
them sustainable?
c. To what extent does the donor-funded telecentre model engender community
ownership and mould donor champions?
d. What are the dynamics of strategic partnerships between the project donors,
the project proposers and the local community actors and how does this
collaboration, or lack thereof, affect the management of the telecentre?
e. What are the key success factors for a sustainable community telecentre?
1.5 Justification for the study
The rationale of this research was to contribute to the findings and vision encapsulated in
the 2003 IDRC study by consolidating knowledge regarding future donor-funded
telecentre projects "in order to share this knowledge widely and contribute to the growing
understanding of the issues and prospects on the continent of Africa" (Etta and Parvyn-
Wamahiu 2003: 6).
Whereas recent telecentre studies in Africa (Schreiner 1998; Benjamin and Dahms 1999;
Benjamin 2000; Benjamin et al 2000; Dagron 2001; Harris 2001; Kiplang'at 2002; Etta
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and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003; Burton 2002) have investigated the nature of use, equipment,
services, relevance, ownership, management and sustainability of a whole range of
telecentres including private cyber cafes, it is clear that they have not specifically
examined the critical role that donors play in the setting up and operations of MCTs in
rural areas. It is this gap in the literature that this study sought to fill. Thus, the study
investigated the whole process of establishment, implementation and sustainability of
telecentres in Nakaseke, Bhamshela and Malawi from a donor perspective. The results of
the research will be useful for researchers, policy and decision makers and development
practitioners with an interest in ICT development in general and telecentre development
in particular.
1.6 Methodology
This study was based on applied research, which emphasises the provision of information
that can be used to solve actual problems. The study used the descriptive research design
utilising the case study approach. Data was collected from the literature (both online and
print), via an email questionnaire and by conducting interviews with various role players
of the MRTP. The methodology used does not allow results to be generalised but it
provides an in-depth insight into the role of donors in the establishment, implementation
and sustainability of MCTs.
1.7 Context of the case studies
The continent's entry and participation in the "information society" is believed to have
started as recently as the mid-1990s and is currently hampered by a weak infrastructure,
lack of local expertise, budgetary constraints and a glaring lack of enabling national
policies (Etta and Paravyn- Wamahiu 2003:7). This section discusses the social, political,
economic and technological environment in which the three cases under review can be
placed. The analysis will provide the backdrop against which the three projects can be
understood and from which inferences concerning their success or failure can be drawn.
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As noted earlier in this Chapter, the reasons behind the choice of these telecentres are
explained in detail in Chapter 3.
1.7.1 Nakaseke Multipurpose Community Telecentre (Uganda)
Uganda has a population of 21 million, of which 88% live in rural areas and largely,
depend on subsistence farming (Mayanja 2001). Nakaseke MCT is located in the 254
square kilometres rural Nakaseke sub-region in the Luweero district of Uganda. It is
about 50 kilometres north of the Capital City, Kampala and 16 kilometres from the
nearest town Wobulenzi. At the time of establishment, the MCT served not only the local
people but also the 24 neighbouring primary schools, four secondary schools, a primary
teacher's college and the nearby hospital (Dagron 2001: 332).
The Nakaseke MCT is part of the broader MCT pilot programme launched at the
coordination meeting for the African Information Society Initiative (AISI) in Addis
Ababa in 1996. The programme was a major component of the Harnessing Information
Technology for Development (HITD), an element of the United Nations (UN) system-
wide Special Initiative for Africa. Three international sponsors, namely IDRC, the
International Telecommunication Union (lTU) and the United Nations Education
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), with support from the Danish donor
agency DANIDA, subsequently undertook a study into the feasibility of MCT pilot
projects and recommended Uganda as one of the participating countries. Uganda was
then invited to develop a plan to set up a single pilot MCT (Mayanja 2001).
The establ ishment of the MCT was also faci litated by the enactment of the 1997 Uganda
Communications Act, which among other issues provided for the liberalisation of the
communications sector. Nakaseke was seen as an excellent site for a pilot programme
because its telecommunications sector and other infrastructure had been severely affected
by the civil unrest between 1980 and 1986 and the sub-region was in the process of
reconstruction. It was also seen as an ideal community because it was sufficiently close to
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Kampala to allow for monitoring and technical support and because the rural community
showed great commitment and enthusiasm for owning and participating in the project
(Mayanja 2001). Uganda was, therefore, able to put forward a sound and comprehensive
proposal and received international funding to initiate this three-year pilot project in early
1998. In that sense, Nakaseke became part of a chain of five UNESCO/ IORC / ITU-
supported telecentre projects initiated in Africa, the others being Benin, Mali,
Mocambique and Tanzania (Oagron 2001: 332; Benjamin and Oahms 1999). The local
partners were Uganda Telecommunications Limited and the Public Libraries Board of
Uganda.
The Nakaseke MCT became operational in March 1999. The general concept was to
provide, in the face of scarce resources, a centre where the rural community could access
information and communication resources (print, video, CD-ROM, telephone, fax, email
and the Internet) and where it could be shown whether providing ICTs to rural
communities could catalyse their development and improve the quality of their lives. The
effectiveness of the MCT strategy was to be measured against the level to which the
community had received increased access to lCTs, local content and its participation in
documenting and using indigenous knowledge (Mayanja 1999).
Community members were first asked to approve the selection of 24 people for a free-of-
charge training programme to ensure that a core group of selected trainees would in turn
train the rest of their community on the use of computer programmes. The trainers were a
group of young people from Uganda Connectivity, a group concerned with Internet
access. The language of instruction was a combination of the local Lugandan and
English. The Telecentre's aim was to serve the entire communities of Nakaseke and
Kasangombe but most particularly the following core user groups: women, youth,
children, the medical community, workers, teachers, students, farmers and local leaders.
The content and programming for the Telecentre was, therefore, primarily tailored
towards meeting the needs and aspirations of its core target groups (Mayanja 1999). For
example, a CD-ROM offering direct access to information for women was developed.
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The CD-RaM's content offers a wealth of information on "best practices" of successful
entrepreneurial women, and the "Small business training manual and marketing
strategies", developed by the Overseas Education Fund (OEF) and field-tested
extensively among low-income women in Africa. The CD-ROM is currently available in
English and Luganda language versions (Women of Uganda Network 2002). The MCT
has been used quite extensively by different groups of people. Figure I below shows
different user groups at Nakaseke MCT.
Figure 1: User groups ofthe Nakaseke Multipurpose Community Telecentre.
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Source: Mayanja (2001).
According to Benjamin and Dahms (1999), the services offered by the N~aseke
Telecentre include computer applications, training, Internet, email, photocopying (the
most popular), telephony, fax, a library, video shows, newspapers, audio recordings and
community listening areas. The building was donated by the community and renovated to
meet the project's requirements. When the Telecentre became operational in 1999, there
was only one fixed telephone line in the entire Nakaseke neighbourhood. However, by
2001, telecommunication infrastructure in the area had expanded to 250 lites and two
public phones in the sub-region in addition to the two in the Telecentre. Mobile telephony
had also started creeping in (Etta and Parvyn-Wamihau 2003: 77). It is intresting to note
that, relative to other telecentres in the country, 61.1 % oftre people in Nakaseke used the
Telecentre as compared to 33.3% of the population around Bugolobi Telecentre and only
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30.0% of those around Nabweru Telecentre (Etta and Parvyn-Wamihau 2003: 83). Table
2 below presents the percentage of user groups at Nakaseke MCT in terms of gender
while Table 3 presents the user group percentage in terms of age.





Table 3: User groups of the Nakaseke MCT in terms of age.
A2e Percenta2e
Under 15 years 4.88%
15-20 years 54.47%
21-30 years 22.76%
Over 30 years 17.89%
Source: Mayanja (2001)
Despite its popularity and usage however, Nakaseke MCT has experienced a number of
problems. Firstly, Webb (2002) notes that frequent power cuts were a constant problem at
the Centre. Moreover, while the Telecentre was, at the time of its opening in 1999, just
about covering costs subsidised by the community, Benjamin and Dahms (1999) warned
that there was no expectation that it could generate enough income to replace obsolete
equipment, let alone repaying the major capital investment from donors. They noted that
the Telecentre required great donor support and so was unlikely to be a model that could
be replicated everywhere in Africa. While Etta and Parvyn-Wamihau (2003: 108) found
that the Telecentre was no longer donor supported, they noted that "the relative success
of the Nakaseke telecentre had depended a lot on the good will and commitment of local
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political leaders". According to Etta and Parvyn-Wamihau (2003: 108), "these leaders
had made tremendous contributions toward community mobilisation, particularly during
the initial stages of the project". In other words, these leaders were instrumental in selling
the telecentre concept to the local community. They can, thus, be seen as heroes or
champions of the project without whom the strides that the MCT has made since its
inception could, arguably, have been impossible.
Secondly, telephone connection was another problematic component. The landline
telephone system at the time of inception was 16 kilometres away from the Telecentre
site. Although the project plans provided for a special telecommunication system, it could
not be achieved in a short period. It was later decided, therefore, that a land line be
established to run 16 kilometres to the Telecentre. The plan provided limited voice
connection to the Telecentre, but accessing the Internet has remained difficult due to the
poor quality of the telephone line (Oagron 2001: 333-335). Huge telephone bills have
also been a constant worry (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003: 84).
Finally, Internet and email services were disappointingly the least utilised services at the
Telecentre. Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu (2003: 83) attributed this to poor electricity supply
and expensive connectivity. Another reason could have been that people did not use the
Internet because it was not yet relevant to their dai Iy Iives, thus raising a critical need to
develop content that is specifically relevant for the local community. Thus, despite its
relative success, the general opinion in Nakaseke was that the management model
presently at the Telecentre would not ensure sustainability (Benjamin and Oahms 1999;
Oagron 2001: 333-335; Etta and Parvyn-Wamihau 2003: 108).
1.7.2 BhamsheJa Telecentre (South Africa)
South Africa occupies 1.2 million square kilometres at the southern end of the continent.
According to the 2003 study by IORC, the country still remains a divided society, with
the white community (11 % of the total population) generally living affluently, whereas
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most of the black African population (72% of the total population) lives in poverty (Etta
and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003: 115). The study reveals that 58% of households in South
Africa have electricity, 45% have water taps inside their homes, and 34% of the
households have a telephone (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003: 115). The IDRC study
further shows that South Africa has by far the largest number of fixed line (estimated to
be 4.9 million in 2002) and mobile connections in Africa. The country also has the most
advanced ICT sector on the continent with nearly three million Internet accounts in 2001.
However, access to ICTs in the country tends to follow lines of existing inequalities,
which are quite wide because of the legacy of apartheid (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003:
I 15).
The main telecommunications operator is a former state-owned giant Telkom, which still
has a monopoly on fixed lines. The Telecommunications Amendment Act of 2001 made
way for the introduction of a second network operator. The government has introduced
special licenses to small, medium and micro enterprises to operate Public Switched
Telephone Networks (PSTN) in rural areas. The cellular phone share of the market has
also grown rapidly in the last few years, with three providers, namely: Vodacom, MTN,
and the recently established Cell C. There are currently more mobile than fixed lines in
South Africa, a situation similar to that in Uganda, Malawi and most parts of the
continent (BMI-Technologies 2002: 403).
Since the democratically elected government led by the African National Congress
(ANC) came into power in 1994, it has attempted to share and spread the riches of the
country to a wider majority of the people. For example, the Telecommunications Act in
the country was enacted in 1996 and the government declared universal access to
telephony as the cornerstone of this policy. The Telecommunications Act created the
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) in July 2000 as the
telecommunications regulator after merging the South African Telecommunications
Regulatory Authority (SATRA) and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA). The
Act also established the Universal Service Agency (USA) as the primary mechanism for
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the provision of ICT access throughout the country. The USA has largely focused on
setting up MCTs and cyberlabs (commercially operated telecentre models which charge
clients for services) in South Africa (Burton 2002: 44; Benjamin et al 2000). Benjamin et
al (2000) add that twelve of the telecentres set up by USA in the country have been with
assistance from lORe. One example of the USA/IORC funded telecentres in South
Africa is the Bhamshela MCT.
Bhamshela is a small town about 90 km east of Pietermaritzburg In an area called
Ozwathini. According to Burton (2002: 45), the process of establishing the Bhamshela
MCT arose from a call of expressions of interest by the USA to which the community
responded by forming an organisation to take the initiative forward. The building housing
the Telecentre was donated by the local community. Two community groups owned the
Telecentre namely, the Bhamshela Arts and Cultural Group and the Open Window
Network, which was a Cape Town based NGO with a chapter in Bhamshela. It was
expected that the Centre would work as a small business enterprise whereby clients
would pay for the use of telephone and fax, photocopying, computing, email and Internet
facilities at a rate that would generate income for the Telecentre (Burton 2002: 45). It was
predicted that this income would enable the Telecentre to become viable after a year, and
that any profits would be ploughed back into the Telecentre to upgrade and develop
resources. The Centre opened in April 1998, to much fanfare and celebration. It boasted
of six telephone lines, a fax machine, a photocopier, a printer, six state-of-the-art Pentium
computers and a scanner. Its two managers (one of whom was a woman) were trained in
computing and management by the USA (Schreiner 1998: 66).
However, what had began as a potential income-generating resource shortly became an
operational nightmare and financial burden to the community. The Internet facility was
only successfully installed at the end of 1999; one year after the MCT had opened. The
printer stopped working after the first day, and until 1999, managers had to walk a long
distance to print at a different facility since they were unable to raise enough capital from
the Telecentre income to buy a new printer (Schreiner 1998: 67). Schreiner (1998) adds
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that services such as scanning, email and the Internet were underutilised. Moreover, the
Telecentre was unable to generate enough income to keep prices at a rate affordable to
all. The telephone was the largest source of revenue due to problems with the other
services. Yet, the revenue realised by the phones was not sufficient to ensure financial
security. By March 1999, prices for telephone services had increased by 150 percent
since the Telecentre's opening, rising from 40 cents per phone call unit to one Rand per
unit (Schreiner 1998: 67). Local demand for phone services persisted, though, and a
Vodacom shop and Telkom container were opened alongside the MCT the following
year, the latter by a former staff member of the Telecentre.
Meanwhile, the Telecentre decided to curb spiralling operational costs by beginning to
offer basic computer training courses. Seemingly, there was demand for such courses due
to the high priority many people placed on finding employment and the perceived
importance of computer skills in formal-sector jobs. However, many students defaulted
on their tuition payments because they could not afford them. Furthermore, very few
graduands from the Telecentre found jobs (lORC 2002). As time went on, Bhamshela
MCT declined in popularity. Schreiner (1998: 67) notes that managers had an uphill task
in encouraging the community to reclaim the MCT for themselves and for them to be
interested in what it had to offer. The Centre shared electricity with a nearby bottle store
with the hope of getting its own electricity in the future (Schreiner 2006). However, that
never materialized during Schreiner's two-year involvement with the Telecentre. The
Telecentre was temporarily closed in late 2001 after experiencing problems with Telkom
resulting from a large bill it could not pay and problems with the phone metering system
(Burton 2002: 45).
Although the MCT resumed operations, it was still hampered by many problems and
most blame has been laid squarely on the donors. For example, Benjamin (200 I), Burton
(2005) and Schreiner (2006) all observe that the USA has for some time been
compromised by a poor reputation, internal management difficulties and poor
relationships with other key organizations such as Telkom. According to Benjamin
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(2001), the USA "was unable to get crucial information from operators that would allow
it to map telecom provision and thus effectively monitor progress". It also "never
developed definitions, indicators or benchmark of key terms that would allow it to
strategize effectively". In addition, the Agency, "partly in response to political pressure",
moved quickly towards implementing the project without other supporting institutions
such as schools, hospitals and other government departments which could have formed a
strong supporting base (Burton 2005). Most worrying, though, is the claim by Schreiner
(2006) that a community needs assessment that could have reconciled the demands of the
community with the services offered by the MCT was not carried out by the USA.
Khumalo (200 I), a former senior employee of the USA, has also raised concerns over the
shortcomings of the USA. Commenting on the evaluation he conducted on some USA
supported telecentres, Khumalo (2001) cites the underutilisation of the Internet and email
services and attributes this to three things. He observes that: "First the operators'
competence in using InternetJemail is lacking. So are most users. Second, most Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) do not have local points of presence (POPs) and access IS
relatively expensive. Thirdly the software installed on most computers IS
inappropriate ... " Khumalo (200 I) also points to the lack of understanding of the
responsibilities and obligations between the operators and the donors, which could have
affected morale. For example, some telecentre operators thought that the USA had to pay
their salaries. Yet, according to Khumalo (2001) this could have been against the USA's
own policy, a situation that reveals lack of adequate communication between the USA
and the telecentre operators who were all trained by the USA. Other issues that the USA
failed to explain more clearly to user communities, according to Khumalo (200 I), related
to ownership of the telecentre business, tariff and pricing guidelines, the equipment,
stocks and payment of expenses.
Thus, in the recent past, some critics have argued that with an ever-increasing budget and
bureaucracy "the ad-hoc projects and impact delivered by the USA ... is unacceptable and
a rethink of South Africa's approach to universal service is required" (Gedye 2006: 8).
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According to Gedye (2006: 8), the USA receives R lOO-million annually from telecoms
operators to increase telecommunications access for poorer communities and more than
R15-million from the Department of Communications for operational costs. He notes,
however, that despite "its inability to deliver affordable communication to under-serviced
areas" and damaging conflict of interest allegations within its ranks (it was recently
revealed that the organization's chairperson was also head of regulatory affairs at
Microsoft South Africa), the USA's mandate is still valid today (Gedye 2006: 8). The
Agency is currently working more closely with the Government Communication
Information Services (GCIS) and the Department of Communications (Burton 2005).
1.7.3 The Malawi Rural Telecentre Project
Malawi is a small landlocked and highly populated country of about 11 million people
bordering Tanzania in the north, Zambia in the west and Mozambique to the west and
south. Over 80% of the population live in rural areas. An average of 126 people per
square kilometre makes Malawi's population density amongst the highest in Africa. The
majority of the rural population are poor with low literacy levels. Literacy levels in
indigenous tongues are higher than literacy in English (World Vision International 2003).
The majority of rural communities in Malawi do not have access to any form of ICTs.
Many rural people must travel long distances in order to access a telephone. There is also
an absence of ICT applications in their activities, which restricts national inclusion and
limits the growth and potential of rural economic activities (ITU 2002a). Thus, the
Government of Malawi, through the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority
(MACRA), developed a strategy to support public access to ICTs in rural areas. These
efforts have been taking place within the context of "Universal Service" goals being
supported by the Government's Rural Telecommunication Policy and the National ICT
Policy (ITU 2002a). Both goals, however, still need cabinet approval according to the
Government official the researcher talked to.
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ICT infrastructure in Malawi is mostly unreliable, sometimes even in major towns. For
instance, telephone lines are poor and most businesses dependent on electricity operate
generators. According to ITU (2002a), the combination of restrictive telecommunications
policies, an unsupportive political framework and financial constraints has also meant
that growth in the telecommunications sector in Malawi has been below the average for
Africa (4.1 % compound annual increases in teledensity between 1995 and 2001,
compared to 6.9% for Africa as whole). Although the situation has substantially
improved recently, with 59 000 fixed lines and 83 000 mobile subscribers in 2002, at
most about 1.3% of the total population on average has direct access to either a mobile or
fixed network (Esselaar 2002). The position of Malawi in relation to selected African
countries on a number of key ICT indicators is shown in Table 4 below:
Table 4: Selected African Countries - Key ICT Indicators (2001)
Country Total Hosts/l0 000 Internet Internet Estimated
Internet people users users/ 10 000 PC's/1000
Hosts people people
Botswana 1273 7.62 25 154.13 3.89
Ghana 235 0.11 40.5 19.36 0.33
Kenya 2702 0.86 500 159.78 0.56
Madagascar 234 0.14 35 21.29 0.24
Malawi 22 0.02 20 17.28 0.35
Mozambique 16 0.01 15 7.43 0.35
Namibia 4632 25.91 45 251.68 3.64
Tanzania 1478 0.41 300 83.41 0.33
Zambia 1095 1.03 25 23.48 0.7
Source: Esselaar (2002)
From January 2000 to June 2002, the number of Internet users in the country grew from
400 to nearly 1400 (see Figure 5 below). In a country with a population of over II
million people, this represents a slow growth indeed. However, as Esselaar (2002) rightly
notes, market penetration was itself constrained by affordability issues, where the small
market size, a monopolistic telecommunications regime and concomitant high prices
made individual access very expensive. In addition to the low penetration of telephones,
the ICT environment was particularly hostile to private sector investment. According to
Esselaar (2002), some of the relevant conditions prevailing in the market at that time
were:
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• Import duties on fully assembled PCs were high.
• Malawi was operating store-and-forward electronic mail systems, with the first
Internet Service Provider (MalawiNet) licensed only in 1997.
• Electricity supply was unreliable and there was limited access in rural areas.
• Fixed line telecommunications and the postal services were government
monopolies managed through one department.
• There was no telecentre policy in the country.
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Since 2000, the telecommunications sector in Malawi has been regulated by MACRA,
which falls under the Ministry of Information. MACRA is responsible for regulating all
forms of communication services including broadcasting and courier services, but not
print media, which are still unregulated. The Malawi Telecommunications Limited
(MTL), which was recently separated from the Malawi Posts Corporation (MPC), has
always been the sole operator of fIXed line telecommunication in the country (lTU
2002a).
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Based on the above profile, the need to expand the availability of ICTs in Malawi is high.
This is why in 2002, the Government came up with the Malawi Rural Telecentre Project
(MRTP). In line with this concept, MACRA requested the ITU to provide technical
assistance to undertake a feasibility study to establish a pilot network of public access to
ICT facilities in rural areas in Malawi. This included the development of an MCT
licensing and promotion strategy that could be established in the country. The MCTs
would provide an appropriate range of services to respond to the local needs of the public
and its institutions, such as schools, hospitals, libraries and NGOs. Two ITU experts
undertook thc study and site visits bctween 8-18 October 2002 and produced the initial
project proposal. This was done in collaboration with MACRA staff and other Malawian
and International agencies, in particular: The Ministry of Information, MPC, MTL,
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP) and United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)
(ITU 2002a).
Subsequent discussions between the government and all the donor agencies resulted in an
agreement to cooperate on the jointly supported project that would establish a range of
five to seven pilot projects in rural Malawi by 2003. The idea was that, with the maturing
of the pilots, the information provided would allow the donor agencies and MACRA to
evaluate the project so as to improve universal access in the country (ITU 2002a).
However, without any proper explanation at all, the project was never implemented and
up to now there are no community telecentres in the country. It is mainly after reading
this sad progression of events that this study was initiated.
The picture of the three cases delineated above is clear. Whereas, on the one extreme of
thc spectrum there is Nakaseke Telecentre, which has been hailed as a relative success
story on the continent, Bhamshela, hampered by chronic management and operational
problems right from the outset is nestled somewhere in the middle. The MRTP, which
never even materialised, is at the other extreme end. The literature shows that the
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unbalanced status of the three cases presented above IS a microcosm of the general
picture of donor-funded telecentres in Africa.
1.8 Scope and limitations of the study
The perspective adopted in this research is very much that of donors. As has been stated,
the study looked at three donor-funded telecentre projects from Uganda, South Africa and
Malawi. Included in the study also are, understandably, the views of other role players
involved in the projects, such as government departments and agencies especially in
Malawi. However, while representatives of these other role players were approached (as
mentioned, in Malawi) for additional information, these role players were not the focus of
this study.
1.9 Outline of the remainder of the thesis
The remainder of the thesis has four Chapters:
Chapter 2 presents a review of the theory of donor aid in Africa in terms of its
emergence and approaches. To begin with, the Chapter discusses and analyses available
research on the concept of donor aid in Africa in its broadest sense before focusing on
donor-funded telecentre projects in the continent. The progress, or lack thereof, of the
three projects under review will also be discussed in this Chapter.
Chapter 3 details the research design and methodology underpinning the study and
explains the basis upon which it was chosen. The criteria for choosing the case studies are
also explained. The Chapter provides detailed information about the population used in
the study, as well as the instrumentation used to gather information from the population.
A description of the data collection and analysis procedures will be given in the Chapter.
Chapter 4 presents, interprets and discusses the results of the study with reference to the
contextual background information regarding the three case studies discussed in Chapter
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I, and with reference to 1iterature review in Chapter 2. Key themes such as telecentre
establishment, implementation and sustainability will be used in the interpretation of the
results.
Chapter 5 summarises the main aspects of the research and draws conclusions. It makes
recommendations and points out directions for future research work.
1.10 Summary
This Chapter has identified and defined the problem of the study, namely an investigation
into the role of donors in donor-funded telecentre projects in Africa. It provided a
detailed account of what the study would cover and how it would approach the research
problem. Key concepts were defined in order to acquaint the reader with the research.
The Chapter provided contextual background information regarding the three telecentres
under review. The Chapter also presented the research objectives and questions. Finally,
the Chapter established the justification, scope and limitations of the study.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The structure of this Chapter will be as follows: Section 2.1 introduces the Chapter while
Section 2.2 traces the historical origins of donor aid. Section 2.3 provides the background
to the development oftelecentres in Africa, while Section 2.4 looks at different telecentre
models. Section 2.5 then explores the origins of donor-aided telecentres in Africa.
Section 2.6 looks at the role of donors in telecentre projects and Section 2.7 concludes the
Chapter.
2.1 Introduction
The review of literature examines issues raised by related studies on the concept of
donor-funded development in developing countries. It looks specifically at the origin of
the concept and its application to donor-funded telecentre projects in Africa. Issues that
are raised include donor pol icies and the merits and demerits of those policies from an
African perspective. It is not clear from the literature whether the policies relating to
donor aid are specifically applicable to donor-funded telecentre projects in Africa.
However, this discussion is necessary as it allows us to understand the broader context
within which donor-funded projects such as MCTs are placed and how they can be
influenced by external factors.
2.2 Donor aid: its historical origins
For much of the last fifty years, development aid simultaneously fulfilled two roles which
are the financing of projects in poor countries which lacked access to world capital
markets and in raising returns to investment through the donor's role in project selection,
design and implementation (Gunning 2000: 2). Over the last two decades, however, the
role of aid has become less clear, partly because these traditional roles have come under
scrutiny. The rationale of receiving aid became further blurred when structural
adjustment lending introduced a third role: the attempt to use aid to buy policy reform in
developing countries (Gunning 2000: 2).
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However, a fairly recent critique of donor aid to developing countries is found in a 1998
World Bank report entitled Assessing Aid (World Bank 1998). The report's argument is
built around two propositions. These are that aid can only be effective in a good policy
environment and that aid cannot buy such an environment. The following section looks at
these two propositions in more detail.
2.2.1 Donor aid and national policy in Africa
Given that the establishment of MCTs in Africa has largely been dependent on donors
(Benjamin and Dahms 1999), a brief background to policy issues regarding donor
supported development projects in Africa becomes necessary for this study. International
donor organizations, such as the United Nations agencies, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) play an important role in shaping national
government policies. They provide the fora, where member states can share development
experience and jointly identify good practice, based on research done in other member
states (Gunning 2000; Ernberg 2002). Moreover, international donor organisations often
assume the responsibility of disseminating "Best Practice" experiences and success
stories. International donors also develop guidelines and standards, which are intended to
help member states to develop their national government policies and to harmonize these
policies globally, when required. To enhance the probability that these guidelines
eventually get used by less developed countries, international donor organizations invest
heavily in awareness and capacity building programmes, including the training of policy
and decision makers in less developed countries (Ernberg 2002). According to Ernberg
(2002), this is usually backed by a huge disbursement of funds.
Morger (1999: 7) argues, however, that this process of policy-making based on
international "consensus" enables economically powerful nations to "persuade" less
developed countries to adopt policies that suit the former's interests and culture but are
not necessarily the best for all nations. Morger (1999) notes further that pol icy guidelines
associated with donor aid need to be reworked so that they become flexible and adaptable
to different social, economic and cultural conditions. For example, African countries
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which adopt national government developmental policies in exchange for huge financial
inducements provided by donors (a practice commonly known as conditionality) should,
ideally, be allowed to test these policies in their own environment first as pilots to see
their effects and subsequently adapt them to suit the local needs.
It should also be borne in mind that what may be "Best Practice" in a specific country
may not be the best in another country. This again underscores the fact that policy
guidelines should be flexible so that they can accommodate new ideas and technologies
in a rapidly changing world. That said, the question that needs to be answered now is
whether the use of donor aid in reforming national policy (Conditionality) has achieved
its intended goal in Africa. This will be the subject of discussion in the next section.
2.2.2 The conditionality of national policy reform ~o donor aid
The effectiveness of donor conditionality, which is the use of donor aid to "buy" policy
reforms from unwilling cl ient governments, has long been questioned (Morger 1999).
One line of criticism arising out of the literature stresses that since donor aid is
temporary, then conditionality can be effective in changing policies only temporarily. In
other words, it may well be possible to use aid to "buy" policy reforms but those reforms
will not be sustained if aid is temporary as it usually is (World Bank 1998). For example,
a government which prefers state controlled trade over free trade may be induced by an
offer of aid to liberalise its trade policy but it would then have no qualms to reverse that
reform once the aid runs out (Rodrik 1995; Collier and Gunning 1992; Killick 1999). To
explain why policy reversals frequently occur, Killick (1999) argues that donor threat to
punish policy reversals by denying future access to funding is not effective given that
there are incentives for donor agencies to continue lending to developing countries.
Policy reversals are, however, a central concern in the empirical literature. It was noted
earlier that the second proposition in the World Bank's Assessing Aid report (1998) was
that aid cannot buy policy reform. In assessing this proposition, it should be noted that for
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conditionality to be effective, it is necessary, but not sufficient that the recipient
government changes its policies in a way deemed desirable by the donor. This may be
seen by noting that when a donor tries to buy policy reforms through conditionality, there
are four conceivable outcomes (Gunning 2000). In the first case, the recipient
government refuses to reform, meaning that conditionality fails. In the second case, the
reforms are adopted but this cannot be credited to the donor's use of conditionality: the
reform would also have been attained in the absence of aid. The third possibility is that
reforms are adopted and would indeed not have been adopted if no aid had been offered
but that the effect is temporary: the reforms are reversed after some time. The final
possibility is one of sustained reform, which would not have occurred without aid
(Gunning 2000).
Gunning (2000) argues that conditionality is truly effective only in the last case. He notes
that it achieves nothing in the first and the second case while in the third case it is
temporarily effective. If the evidence that conditionality does not work is accepted, the
donor can either redesign the aid contract to improve it or abandon the approach in favour
of a different form of conditionality commonly known as "selectivity" (see below).
Redesigning the aid contract weakens project ownership while abandoning it seems to
reinforce it. However, Gunning (2000) notes that the problem with conditionality goes
beyond feasibility as one may well question its desirability as well. Inevitably, if donors
are to succeed in achieving objectives which are not fully shared by the national
government, then the government's accountability to its people may be undermined. In
that sense, conditionality is effective in the same way as colonialism was and hence
suffers from the same objection. Stiglitz (1998) describes the debilitating effect of
conditional ity:
Rather than learning how to reason and develop analytical capabilities, the
process of imposing conditionality undermines both the incentives to acquire
those capacities and confidence in the ability to use them. Rather than involving
larger segments of the population in a process of discussing change, thereby
changing their ways of thinking, it reinforces traditional hierarchical relationships.
Rather than empowering those who could serve as catalysts for change within
these societies, it demonstrates their impotence. Rather than promoting the kind of
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open dialogue that is central to democracy, it argues at best that such dialogue is
unnecessary, at worst that it is counterproductive.
In summary then, donor conditionality has proved to be ineffective. It may well be
possible to make it more effective. However, this would simply reinforce the undesirable
effects stressed by Stiglitz (1998) above. The alternative, therefore, is "selectivity".
2.2.3 Selectivity
Ifaid effectiveness depends crucially on the quality of the policy environment and donors
are powerless to change policies with aid, then all they can do is improve efficiency
through what is known as selectivity in the allocation of aid. This means that donors
would bias the allocation of aid in favour of countries with good policy environments.
Some bilateral donors, notably, the Nordic countries, are rapidly moving in this direction
(World Bank 1998). Selectivity can be seen as the most radical reform of conditionality
since it abandons all pretence that aid can buy policy change. However, the selectivity
proposal has encountered at least two objections.
The first objection has been that selectivity unfairly punishes poor people living under
bad governments with bad policies by denying them development aid (Collier et aI1997).
According to Collier et al (1997), this objection is difficult to understand as aid to such
governments is unlikely to benefit the poor anyway and may well harm them by
financing the continuation of a bad policy regime. Conversely, selectivity does not rule
out the possibility that aid can be channelled directly to poor people rather than to their
governments (Collier et aI1997).
However, the most serious objection to selectivity in aid allocations is that it may run into
the same problems as conditionality, especially if it leads to the donor-recipient
bargaining over the quality of the policy environment. Selectivity ties a country's aid
allocation to an assessment of its policies. Some aspects of a "good policy environment"
can be defined unambiguously in objective terms, but in many cases an element of
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judgement by the donor will be inevitable (Collier et al 1997). The donor's judgement
may sometimes be challenged by the recipient government. In that case, the national
government and the donor would return to haggling, which usually characterises
conditionality. Selectivity would then conflict with project ownership in the sense that the
donors would try to impose their preferences on the various aspects of the policy regime
(Collier et al 1997). The issues discussed above are very significant as they are relevant
to the success of donor-funded telecentre initiatives in Africa.
As noted in Chapter I, donor-funded telecentres are also known as MCTs (the two terms
will be used interchangeably in this study). This means they are intended for all members
of a rural community or a deprived urban area. It also means, as we shall see in more
detail later in this Chapter, that MCTs can provide a wide range of ICT - based services
ranging from simple information services to e-Iearning, e-commerce and telemedicine
besides user training and support. In addition, they may provide many other services such
as Iibrary services, business support and a forum for all those involved in community
development which is not necessarily ICT - based. Thus, MCT projects are inherently
cross-sectoral and, as such, provide a test bed for the development of policies regarding
practically all the issues that need to be addressed in a comprehensive set of national and
communication policies (Ernberg 2002).
In these projects, different types of policies can be tested, both national (by government)
and international (by donors). These projects can also provide opportunities to identify
possible harmful effects and remedies of unsuitable policies. This can help donors as well
as local decision makers to develop development policies adapted to the country's
economic, social and cultural environment.
2.3 Background to telecentres in Africa
While ICT's have become widespread in the North, with Internet and email facilities
available at work, in schools and even in most private homes, this is far from the case in
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the South. For example, most Africans have never made a phone call, let alone used a
computer or searched the World Wide Web for information. Most African communities
do not have Internet access as access is found only in the major cities and towns (see
Section 1.3). The need to expand the availability of ICTs in the African continent is
therefore, high. The challenge is how to make ICTs available in African communities or
communities in the South in general (Christiansen 2002).
As noted in Chapter I, the answer to this limitation has been the establishment of
telecentres. While there is no single definition of telecentres to satisfy everyone (see
Section 1.2.3), a common characteristic is that a telecentre is a physical space that
provides public access to ICTs for educational, personal, social, and economic
development (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003: 13). However, the available technologies
vary greatly from one telecentre to another. A well-equipped telecentre will include a
public pay phone and fax (for receiving and sending) as well as a photocopying machine.
However, more advanced telecentres will provide several phone lines and more
computers with 24 hour high-speed broad bandwidth Internet connection. The use of
multi-media computers, with speakers and microphones, if possible, will offer the
possibility of using CD-ROMs and DVDs. A scanner, a colour printer, a video camera
and perhaps even a digital camera could be included. The type of equipment available
and the service offered is often determined by available funds, community needs and
imagination (Christiansen 2002).
2.4 Telecentres and the Internet
Telecentres that employ ICTs are a relatively recent phenomenon. The first ones were
built in Denmark and Sweden between 1983 and 1985. The idea has been taken up quite
widely in Europe, notably in the United Kingdom (Simmins 1997). More recently, and on
a limited scale, they have been established in developing countries. As noted in Chapter
1, such facilities are called a number of names, including "virtual village halls," "tele-
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learning centres," and "telecottages". Telecentres are also a venue in which the Internet
can interface with conventional ICTs (print, radio and video) (Anderson et al 1998).
The Internet is relatively cheap, powerful, decentralized and potentially an ideal platform
to build a flexible and powerful environment for sharing and learning. It is also the first
communication tool that allows every user to be a sender, receiver and broadcaster in a
global sphere (Richardson )997). Richardson (1997) adds that the nature of the Internet
suggests that it can be an effective tool for development, and the success of telecentres in
Europe suggests that telecentres may be an effective mechanism for making the Internet
and other ICTs available to rural communities. This explains the recent initiation of a
number oftelecentre pilot projects in many African countries.
2.5 Telecentre models
Careful reading of the literature reveals that discussion of telecentres is always clouded
by the fact that the word covers different types of projects while alternative terms can be
used interchangeably to describe them (Menou 2003: 631). Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu
note that there are currently three main ownership models regarding telecentres, which
are: private (individual) owned, NGO owned and trusteeship owned. MCTs, which are
the focus of this study, fall under the category of trusteeship. In this arrangement, the
telecentre project "is ... held in trust by the executing agency for a specified period until
the owner, i.e., the community is ready to take over" (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003:
163). As can be seen from Table 5 below, there are key variables which inform different
telecentre models. These variables will usually determine the suitability of different
telecentre models in different contexts.
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Table 5. Key variables associated with telecentres
Narrow focus Multipurpose
Provides access to technology only. Provides services, e.g. training,
development information.
Community-based Establishment
Represents a broad constituency. Top-down government or business
organisation based.
Stand alone Attached
Not associated with another institution. Operates as part of another institution,
e.g. school, government units.
Thematic Universal
Specific to theme, e.g. education, health. Whole community needs.
Independent Networked
Operates alone. Works with other telecentres.
Profit oriented Service oriented
Operates as a business. Operates as a service.
Public funded Privately funded
Funded by public funds. Obtains funds privately.
Source: Colle (2000).
For the purpose of this study, the researcher will differentiate the bigger donor-funded
MCT model from the largely small private sector model. In brief, private sector
telecentres provide services at a price and are, therefore, profit oriented while the donor
supported MCT model "seeks to meet social needs beyond the market place" (Benjamin
et al 2000). Benjamin et al (2000) have looked at what the experience of each of these
two models can tell us.
2.5.1 Private sector telecentres
Benjamin et al (2000) note that the last few years have seen a multiplication of privately
owned telecentres in Africa. Also known as phone shops, these centres are primarily run
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by small entrepreneurs and are generally quite successful. The centres start off by
offering basic telephone services, but gradually move into fax and even Internet services
as the market develops. In Africa, Senegal is believed to have the largest number of
privately owned telecentres (estimated to be over 9,000 in 2000), which have been
supported by Sonatel, the national telecommunications company (Webb 2002). Since
starting in 1992, there were well over 6,000 private telecentres in Dakar by 2000 and by
2002 they were increasingly spreading towards the rural areas. While telephony is the
main service, other services such as fax and photocopying are offered, with 1% of
revenue coming from Internet use (Webb 2002).
A different private sector model has been offered by Africa Online (Webb 2002). Africa
Online is an Internet company, which by 2002 had established up to 261 so called E-
Touch centres in Kenya, predominantly in Nairobi. These centres offer email, Internet,
fax, photocopying, printing and telecommunication services. According to Webb (2002),
the E-Touch centres are reasonably successful businesses in Kenya but their costs make
their services out of reach for most Kenyans. Webb (2002) adds that Africa Online was
also launched in Ghana in 1997. However, after much initial enthusiasm, most of the
centres closed down due to poor telephone line quality in most parts of the country.
In South Africa, Vodacom had by 2000 established 1,800 phone shops housed in metal
shipping containers and costing about R25, 000 each (Benjamin et al 2000). Most of
these teleccntres are successful and financially profitable. All are privately owned and
they do not claim to be offering any social service. Like similar models in Senegal and
Kenya, Vodacom phone shops offer telephony and a few are experimenting with fax and
computer facilities (Benjamin et al 2000).
Therefore, privately owned telecentres are generally profitable and successful. The
owner's investment is often an important motivation to successful management. In fact,
Webb (2002) notes that in Senegal, privately owned telecentres were generating a
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monthly income of approximately US$200 per line while also contributing around 0.5%
of the country's GDP.
2.5.2 Donor-funded telecentres
Very different from the small-scale, private sector facilities discussed above are donor-
funded telecentres. The main programmes in Africa have been a partnership between
ITU, UNDP, IDRC and other donors. This partnership has seen the establishment of
telecentres in Mali, Uganda, Mocambique, South Africa and other African countries
(Benjamin and Dahms 1999). Donor-funded telecentres tend to be more expensive,
costing as much as US$250,000 each, and can offer a range of telephony, computing,
Internet and e-mail services. Moreover, donor-funded teJecentres stress community
participation and sustainability, which is why they are also known as MCTs. According
to Benjamin et al (2000), however, none in Africa had at that time shown that they could
be self-sustaining after the external funding had ceased.
At best, MCTs have so far only covered operating costs, sometimes not including phone
bills and salaries. According to Benjamin et al (2000), no major donor-funded telecentre
has been able to set aside funds for depreciation of equipment, let alone generate enough
money to repay the initial capital. In most cases, there have been greater technical
problems than anticipated (see Chapter 1). Many of the donor-funded telecentres have
been top-down projects, certainly with some community participation, but within the
guidelines of the external funders (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003; Jensen and
Esterhuysen: 200 I). As a result, Benjamin et al (2000) warned that whilst there was some
evidence at that time regarding the usefulness of ICTs in development, none of the
existing donor-funded telecentres in Africa could be rolled out on any large scale as they
did not represent a model that was suitable for universal access as opposed to individual
projects.
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2. 6 Origins of donor-funded telecentre projects in Africa
As noted earlier in this Chapter, most rural communities in African countries are likely to
access modern ICTs through MCTs. This is meant to ensure that development is as
effective, efficient, sustainable and equitable as possible.
The very first of the donor-funded telecentres in Africa was established in Timbuktu in
Mali in May 1998. Sotelma, the national telecommunications company, was the main
local implementer, with the main partners being the ITU, Television Mali, UNESCO and
IORC. Most of the funding of around US$200,000 came from the donors (Webb 1999).
After the Mali project, there has been a growing interest on the part of African
governments, the private sector, international donors and community organisations
towards the use of MCTs to provide access to ICTs. In Africa, MCTs have mainly been
seen as a means of addressing the lack of ICTs and providing universal access to both
telephony and other forms of ICTs (Etta and Parvyn-Wamaihu 2003). MCTs can also
facilitate an efficient and cost-effective flow of information, products and capital across
national and regional boundaries. Yet, as earlier noted in Chapter 1, telecentres should
not be seen as a panacea for rural development problems. Rather, they have the potential
to help the rural poor to overcome some of the traditional barriers to development, by
improving access to information, expanding their market base, enhancing employment
opportunities and making government services work better (Snyman and Snyman 2003:
105; UNESCAP 2002).
However, this requires a good infrastructure and an enabling policy environment.
Effective ICT policies are necessary to provide the basic infrastructure for connectivity
and access, develop human capacity, offer affordable demand-driven ICT services and
involve local stakeholders and beneficiaries in project design, implementation and
management. Secondly, special attention needs to be given to disadvantaged members of
the community such as women, youth and persons with disabilities during project
development and implementation. Finally, the liberalisation of the telecommunication
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sector by national governments can dramatically expand connectivity and reduce costs
(UNESCAP 2002). What fol lows are the benefits of MCTs in rural communities.
2.7 Benefits of telecentres to rural communities
As noted in the introduction to the study, poverty in Africa is concentrated in rural areas.
By their very nature, many rural areas are remote from industrial zones, urban markets
and urban employment opportunities, thus making it difficult for them to achieve
economic growth. The major economic activity in most rural areas is agriculture, which
is generally less productive than industry. Rural infrastructure lags far behind that in
urban areas. In addition, rural areas are disadvantaged due to poor education and health
service provision (Molner and Karvalics 2002: 327; Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003:
170). Thus, enabling rural areas to overcome these disadvantages is a major policy
challenge for governments and civil societies in Africa.
This section suggests that MCT services can be effectively used to overcome some of
these obstacles to social development in rural areas and empower the rural poor. Some of
the benefits that telecentres can provide to these marginalised communities are as
follows:
2.7.1 Information service
Modern ICTs found in telecentres make it easy and cheap to provide customized
information systems for the poor. The Internet offers more flexibility in the collection,
retrieval, updating and presentation of information than traditional electronic media, such
as radio and television (Martin and McKeown ]993: 145; Gomez and Ospina 2001).
There are many telecentre initiatives aimed primarily at improving the availability of
market and other information likely to improve the livelihood of the poor. A good
example is the Bhamshela Telecentre in South Africa. The Telecentre provides public
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access to telecommunications (telephone, facsimile and Internet) and information
services (health, education, market data, technology and livelihood) to a disadvantaged
community (Schreiner 1998: 66). Similarly, Nakaseke Telecentre in Uganda provides the
rural community with data on agricultural practices, the cost and availability of farm
inputs (pesticides, fertilizers and seeds), health, welfare opportunities and other useful
information (Benjamin and Dahms 1999).
Elsewhere, initiatives such as the Warana Telecentre in India's Maharashtra State,
enables villagers to access agricultural, medical and educational information through the
Internet. Many farmers visit the Telecentre daily to access information on crop
cultivation practices and schedules, quantities harvested and sold, net income due to
them, pest and disease control, and marketing. Significantly, all information is provided
in the local language. Farmers consider the Internet service at the Telecentre a better
source of information than traditional sources such as traders, field officers, television,
radio and the print media. By providing neutral information, this Telecentre service also
minimizes cheating by unscrupulous traders when quoting the prices of farm products
(UNESCAP 2002).
2.7.2 E-commerce
Electronic commerce, or e-commerce, involves the sale or purchase of goods or services
over computer-mediated networks, particularly the Internet. Such goods and services may
be ordered over the Internet, but payment and ultimate delivery may be online or oftline
(Robinson 2000). African countries can benefit from e-commerce through easier access
to markets in developed countries and higher incomes resulting from these new trading
opportunities.
E-commerce has already found a niche in some rural areas in Africa. The Rural
Women's Association in Sekhukhuneland, Northern Province, South Africa, which sells
its agricultural products to buyers all over the world through a telecentre put up by USA
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in 1998 is a good example (Rhodes 2003). However, e-commerce applications in African
countries encounter several serious barriers. Shemi and Magembe (2003) warn that issues
related to taxation, consumer protection and intellectual property rights have yet to be
resolved at the national and international levels. They add that the infrastructure to
provide the physical delivery of goods is still very incipient, and costly for small
businesses in Africa.
2.7.3 Employment generation
The emergence of telecentre services In rural areas can also generate new business
enterprises such as selling of ICT equipment and accessories; provision of ICT services
such as Internet access, word-processing and telephone operations; provision of training
and educational support; as well as repairing and maintaining of ICT equipment
(Benjamin and Dahms 1999; Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003). Such enterprises provide
direct job opportunities for traders, teachers, computer operators, technicians and
administrative and secretarial support staff.
Telecentres can also offer innumerable indirect employment opportunities by improving
the business prospects of rural-based enterprises through a better access to market
information, improved production technology and more efficient marketing systems
(Rhodes 2003). For example, telecentre services in Pondicherry, India, have inspired
vi llagers to utilize their considerable knowledge of local herbs for the establishment of a
herb-processing centre. The villagers have learned how to package and market the herbs
by using the services of the telecentre. Around 300 rural women are currently engaged in
the herb-processing project (UNESCAP 2002).
However, the ILO (2001) notes that illiteracy, poor infrastructure and general lack of
access to lCTs undermines the quality of the e-jobs in Africa and consequently, their
ability to improve the Iiving conditions of rural communities. In addition, the number of
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workers doing these kinds of jobs remains very limited on the continent, where training
and education have yet to be improved and expanded to all sectors of the population.
2.7.4 Education and training
Perhaps the most tangible benefit, so far derived by developing countries from the
telecentre initiatives, is access to vast resources that enhance education and training at
minimal or no cost. The Internet currently hosts thousands of distance-learning and
training programmes on virtually any conceivable subject (Gomez and Ospina 2001).
Distance learning has been particularly useful in Africa, where affordability and
geography are real barriers to access to education.
Efforts have been made in recent years to develop ICT-based education and training tools
at the community level through telecentres. One notable example is the NetTel@Africa
project. A core activity of the project is the development of learning modules that are
hosted on the website. These modules are developed through partnerships between seven
African universities: Universities of Zambia, Botswana, Oar es Salaam, Western Cape,
South Africa, Fort Hare, and Witwatersrand and three American Universities:
Universities of Colorado-Boulder, Florida-Gainesville, and Michigan State. The modules
can be accessed by students all over Africa (NetTel@Africa 2005).
Thus far, Internet based education in Africa has only benefited a minority of privileged
students who can afford and have access to online educational opportunities (Lax 2001:
107). The inclusiveness of digital education is, in fact, still very limited, especially taking
into account the great disparities that still prevail between urban and rural communities in
Africa, as well as the structural lack of access and training opportunities for the majority
of the African population (Robinson 2000). MCTs can, thus, play a big role in
overcoming these barriers.
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2.7.5 Health and medical information
The exchange of information constitutes a major aspect of medical care. Some medical
web sites offer doctors and health workers venues for the exchange of professional
information and experiences on illnesses and treatments. Thanks to MCTs, rural hospitals
in India are making use of such web sites to access medical information from more
developed countries (UNESCAP 2002). In addition, health workers in some developing
countries are obtaining medical training through telecentres. Several new Internet sites
provide innovative "teach and test" self-assessment modules on diseases such as malaria.
Furthermore, centralized data repositories connected to telecentre networks enable remote
health-care professionals to keep abreast of the rapidly evolving stock of medical
knowledge (UNESCAP 2002).
However, although the Internet contains volumes of information on health and medical
care, this information resource is of little use to the rural poor if there are no
intermediaries who can simplify, translate, repackage and disseminate information at
these telecentres. If health information services are to have a direct impact on the rural
poor, they must be both comprehensible and accessible to the target users. Instructions
have to be simplified, well illustrated and adapted to local conditions. Advice on
treatments should consider indigenous, inexpensive and locally available materials
(Gomez and Ospina 200 1).
2.7.6 Good governance
National governments in Africa can use [CTs in MCTs to improve the quality and
efficiency of public services, strengthen intra-government information flows, promote
accountability and transparency, procure goods and services fairly and efficiently,
encourage citizens' participation in decision-making processes and inform citizens about
government operations and services (Heeks 200 1). Through electronic forums, bulletin
boards and email provided by telecentres, national governments could enable their
citizens to participate in public discussions, report any malpractices by government
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officials and voice their complaints about government service irregularities (Heeks 2001).
Heeks (200 I) adds that telecentres could be of great relevance to marginalized
communities and groups, such as women, youth and ethnic minorities, by enabling them
to share and exchange information of mutual interest, strengthen their collective power
and find their own development solutions. He concludes that good governance is a crucial
element in rural poverty alleviation because delays and corruption in government services
affect the poor people more than any others.
However, while the potential opportunities offered bye-government via telecentres are
numerous, African governments need to be cautious. Gomez and Ospina (2001) advise
that before allocating large sums for investments or undertaking large-scale telecentre
projects, they should ensure that lower-level government organizations and citizens are
ready to accept change and are capable of financially supporting the required
infrastructure.
2.7.7 Social empowerment of women
Due to the entrenchment of patriarchy, many of the positive aspects of the information
and communications revolution in Africa have bypassed poor women (Etta and Parvyn-
Wamahiu 2003). As a result, women have thus far benefited less from leTs found in
telecentres (Schreiner 1998; Ochieng and Radloff 2001). Women, therefore, need to be
actively involved in the definition, design and development of new technologies, which
may be available in telecentres. Otherwise the information revolution in Africa might
simply bypass them.
In recent years, a number of telecentre-related initiatives aimed at the social
empowerment of women have emerged. Most of these initiatives are relevant to women
across the rural-urban divide, but some specifically address the needs of rural women.
For example, the aforementioned Rural Women's Association in Sekhukhuncland,
Northern Province, South Africa (Rhodes 2003), and village herb-processing operations
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in India (UNESCAP 2002) have used telecentres as a tool for women empowerment
through e-commerce. Still in rural India, the ILO (2001: 58) reports that telecentres and
fax booths had by 2001 created 250,000 jobs, mainly for women through women-owned
businesses. Experience has shown that women-owned businesses, such as these, generate
a higher rate of female patronage than male-owned businesses (lLO 200 I: 58).
Another example comes from Nakaseke Telecentre, where Joyce Namayanja, who
specialized in designing school badges, banners and signposts, had this to say:
Before I attended computer lessons at the telecentre, I was using the freehand
style to design my work. This was taking a lot of time and was not very neat.
When the Telecentre opened, I enrol led for computer lessons in word processing,
Excel and other packages. With this knowledge, I can now design using the
computer. Computer knowledge has helped me improve on the quality of my
work, making it faster and easier. This has also increased my clientele base. These
days we also just call (our suppliers in Kampala using the telecentre phone) and
give them specifications of the goods we need. The suppliers collect the money
from our local taxi drivers whom they give the goods. This has saved the business
money and time, which would have been incurred on transport (lTU 2002b).
These examples demonstrate that Internet services in telecentres can be instrumental in
the empowerment of women in Africa. Women scholars, activists and practitioners
believe that these tools have also enabled women to forward their concerns to the global
community, thus raising awareness and chance to advocate for their rights and hence
reduce their marginalisation within their communities (Ochieng and Radloff2001).
In conclusion, this section has shown that MCT servIces can be effectively used to
overcome some obstacles to social development in rural areas and empower the rural
poor. However, as noted earlier in this Chapter, MCTs are expensive and require a huge
infusion of donor funds to establish, implement and sustain. What follows is a discussion
of the role of donors in the establishment, implementation and sustainability of these
projects.
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2. 8 The role of donors in telecentre projects
Even though there appears to be a general agreement on the basic function of donor-
funded telecentres in Africa (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003: 10), there seems, as
alluded to earlier in the rationale of the study, to be very little understanding about the
role of donors regarding the establishment, implementation and sustainability of these
projects. This could be due to the general lack of literature on this subject. However, it
has been suggested that the establishment, implementation and sustainability of donor-
funded telecentres evolve over time. Furthermore, Fuchs (in Etta and Paravyn-Wamahiu
2003: 31) makes reference to three stages, namely: the investment stage, contract stage
and user fee stage, which donors are usually interested in.
• The investment stage is seen as characterising the early stages of the project.
This is where donors form partnerships with local stakeholders in an attempt to
build community capacity by encouraging them to participate in the project. At
this stage, the donor organisation finances the project, as well as providing
equipment and training for local partners, key persons and staff.
• In the contract stage the telecentre has gained autonomy from the "parent" donor
organisation. It then starts to make contractual agreements with other agencies
and government organisations such as hospitals or schools and the building up of
clientele to which it provides services and support.
• By the time the telecentre gets to the user fee stage donor dependency is a thing
of the past. By this time the communities are well aware of the products and
benefits of the telecentre and are, therefore, willing to pay for the services.
The implication of an evolutionary view is that it is only a matter of time before
telecentres become independent and self-sustaining. However, Dagron (2001) and Etta
and Paravyn-Wamahiu (2003) are of the opinion that this is a dangerous over-
simplification. According to the three researchers, the evolutionary thesis gives scant
attention to the political, economic and social realities that inform all donor-funded
projects. Dagron (2001) adds that very few examples at the user fee stage have been
described in the literature and this is perhaps proof that very few projects have advanced
to this stage. Dagron (200 I) argues further that the evolutionary paradigm ignores
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important factors, which often define the role of donors at different levels of a telecentre
project. The following section looks broadly at some of these factors:
2.8.1 Role of donor policies in the management, ownership and sustainability of
telecentre projects
The concept of ownership must begin the moment donors establish dialogue with
beneficiaries of a tclccentre project and along the process of conceiving, planning and
implementing the project. Donors now understand that beneficiaries of MCTs need to be
involved in the activities leading up to the social and economic development of their
community. This is critical for the sustainability of the project once the external funding
has ended as it always does (Dagron 2001: 10; Etta and Paravyn-Wamahiu 2003: 162-3).
In that sense, donors have realised that ownership cannot be promoted if the beneficiaries
do not contribute to the decisions made before the telecentre project started. For example,
in the 2003 IDRC funded study, Etta and Paravyn-Wamahiu (2003:163) note that
community ownership of telecentres "was implied and vocally affirmed by key
informants" in all of the five African countries in which they conducted the study. This
was evidenced by the fact that local community members were involved in some aspects
of management in all of the five telecentres studied (Etta and Paravyn-Wamahiu
2003:163).
However, the two researchers caution that "the extent of involvement of the local
committees was not always clear and their level of responsibility often did not extend
beyond supporting fundraising and mobilisation for the MCTs" (Etta and Paravyn-
Wamahiu 2003: 163). They argue that ownership by its very nature ought to confer
ultimate control but they concluded in their study that local communities in Mocambique,
Senegal, Uganda, South Africa and Mali were not in control of "their" projects. In fact,
they pointed out that telecentre managers, who were employees of the donor agencies,
often had more decision-making authority over the telecentres than members of the local
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management committees. This was evident where decisions affecting day-to-day
management of the telecentres had to be continuously vetted by representatives of donor
agencies even when the decisions had already been endorsed by the local management
committees (Etta and Paravyn-Wamahiu 2003: 163). For example, the local communities,
generally, could not recruit staff or set prices without the approval of donor agencies
(Etta and Paravyn-Wamahiu 2003: 109). At Nabweru Telecentre (Uganda), the printer
could not be used because cartridges had run out and the telecentre had to wait for a long
time for the overseeing agency to authorise the purchase and eventual supply of the
cartridges. At Buwama Telecentre (Uganda), the researchers also report a pattern of
prolonged power struggle between the local management committee and the telecentre
staff, which affected the operations of the centre (Etta and Paravyn-Wamahiu 2003: 159).
Based on the above factors, Etta and Paravyn-Wamahiu (2003: 163) observe that "it is ...
masking the truth to say that the communities owned the telecentres". Whilst ownership
presupposes control, the two researchers saw no evidence that local communities were in
control of the projects. Etta and Paravyn-Wamahiu (2003: 163), however, are unsure
whether the local communities' lack of control over the projects was a deliberate
exclusionary ploy by the donors and the executing agencies so that they could retain
control over activities and budgets or whether it was borne out of a genuine lack of
experience by the local communities themselves. What they were sure about, however,
was the enthusiasm of local community members to be involved in the management of
the MCTs. This scenario is significant especially in the face of poor, unresponsive or
mediocre management, which has characterised donor-funded telecentres on the
continent (Benjamin 2000).
2.8.2 Role of donors in the scale of the telecentre project.
Another important element in understanding the role of donors in the establishment,
implementation and sustainabiJity of donor-funded teJecentres is the donors' need for
"scale". According to Dagron (200 I: 11), donors' decisions regarding the scale of
telecentre projects in Africa have in the past either paralysed cooperation between
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stakeholders or led to "gigantic and artificial projects" resulting in resounding project
failures. Dagron (2001: 11) adds that the issue of scale is often related to the donors'
political agenda and internal administrative regulations rather than to community
development. The requirements of proving "success" in the short term or measuring a
project in numbers of beneficiaries (the higher the better), while excluding long-term
benefits and sustainability, have led to telecentre projects which are only "successful"
while funding is available (Dagron 2001: 11; Benjamin 2001; Benjamin and Dahms
1999).
Thus, various experts in the field (Dagron 200 I: 11; Benjamin 200 I; Benjamin and
Dahms 1999; Etta and Paravyn-Wamahiu 2003) have argued that donors' interest with
the scale of the project is not always the right long-term solution since macro-level
telecentre projects cannot replace bottom-up networking. They add that the international
donor community is still reluctant to acknowledge many years of failures and millions of
dollars worth of wasted resources due to ill planned macro programmes. This means that
the donors' eagerness to show short-term results and extend leT coverage to large
numbers of people on the continent has not been a major success.
2.8.3 Role of donors in telecentre evaluation
Anderson et al (1998) argues that the evaluation of telecentre projects in Africa is still a
donor driven exercise, which remains external to the beneficiaries. He notes that even if
institutions special ised in doing evaluations represent a different industry, the fact of the
matter is that by contracting private evaluators, donors keep control over telecentre
evaluations.
Some experts (Anderson et al 1998; Dagron 2001; Etta and Paravyn-Wamahiu 2003;
Webb 2002) have also highlighted contradictions in the manner in which most telecentre
evaluations are done. The main contradiction is that beneficiaries are cut off from the
entire exercise and are seen only as the objects of the study and not subjects that can
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contribute to the evaluation process. Other aspects that compromise the results of donor
funded telecentre evaluations in Africa are:
Firstly, the fact that donors sponsor the evaluation of their own projects has an impact on
the quality of results. Experts warn that evaluators are likely to be biased since they
depend on future contracts with the same or similar organisations (Anderson et al 1998;
Dagron 200 I: 12).
Secondly, telecentre evaluations are often done by experts with little knowledge about the
cultural, political and social context of the local community. In most cases they do not
speak their language and the consultants are usually from private companies based in the
United States and Europe. Very few telecentre projects hire national consultants with a
background that facilitates a higher understanding of local culture (Anderson et al 1998;
Dagron 2001: 12).
Thirdly, the evaluation instrument is usually taken from already existing models. That is,
donors simply adapt it for a particular project without sufficient consultation with the
grassroots communities and with little consideration of existing cultural aspects (Dagron
2001: 13).
Fourthly, Dagron (2001: 13) and Etta and Paravyn-Wamahiu (2003) note that for
statistical purposes, most telecentre evaluations avoid open questions and concentrate on
checklist type formats that aim at obtaining numbers and percentages as opposed to
qualitative assessments.
Finally, Dagron (2001: 13) argues that the timing of evaluations is habitually donor
driven and has no relevance to an evaluation of the project benefits to the community. He
argues furthermore that evaluations are often done so that a picture of the development
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process is captured at its best moment. On the strength of these factors, it may be inferred
that any information that an evaluation may bring is often of more use to the donors than
to the beneficiaries.
2.9 Summary
This Chapter has focused on two functions of aid, which are: (1) providing finance and
(2) changing policies in recipient countries. In reviewing this debate, the Chapter has
stressed the ineffectiveness of aid in the second of these roles and the desirability of
redefining the first role more clearly. This Chapter has shown that rather than redesigning
the aid package to make conditionality more effective, donors sometimes switch to
selectivity. Under selectivity, the allocation of aid is tied to success. The Chapter also
commented on the donor induced policy environment within which the donor-funded
telecentre initiative has unfolded in Africa. The Chapter then looked at the benefits of
these initiatives to rural communities in Africa before analysing the role played by donors
in these projects.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
This Chapter has been structured in the following manner: Section 3.1 introduces the
Chapter while Section 3.2 presents the research methodology used in the study. The
Chapter then presents the research population in Section 3.3, discusses data collection
methods in Section 3.4 and presents the actual data the study collected in Section 3.5.
Data analysis procedures appear in Section 3.6, while the evaluation of research
methodology used for this study is done in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 summarises the
Chapter.
3.1 Introduction
This Chapter details the research design and methodology underpinning the study. The
purpose of the study was to examine the role of donors in the establishment,
implementation and sustainability of donor-funded telecentres in Africa. The nature of
this study is applied research, meaning that emphasis was placed on providing
information that can be used in addressing actual telecentre establishment,
implementation and sustainability issues on the continent. To answer the research
questions posed in the study and attain the objectives stated in Chapter I, section 1.4.2,
the exploratory research design, utilising the case study methodology, was employed to
gather data. This Chapter contains detailed information about the population of the study,
data collection methods and data analysis procedures.
3.2 Exploratory research design
The research design is the logical plan of how the study is conducted (Yin 1989). The
role of a research design is to connect questions to data. An exploratory research design
"is often conducted because a problem has not been clearly defined as yet or its real
scope is still unclear" (Cilliberti 2004). Cilliberti (2004) adds that this method focuses on
gathering information In depth and "will probe to explore feelings,
motivation ... behaviour and so on". Furthermore, Ngulube (2005) notes that exploratory
research examines the WHY and not just the WHAT in the data. In this study,
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exploratory research was used to gain an in-depth insight into the key success factors and
failures of donor-funded telecentres in Africa. The exploratory research method was
chosen for this study because of the nature of the problem and the data needed. There are
many different forms of exploratory research, such as case studies, focus groups, in-depth
interviews, content analysis and observation to mention but a few (Ngulube 2002). For
the purpose of this research, the case study methodology was used.
3.2.1 Case study approach
Case studies are in-depth studies of particular events, circumstances or situations that
offer the prospect of revealing understandings of a kind which might escape other
research methodologies (Yin 1984). A case study is an empirical enquiry that:
Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when the
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which
multiple sources of evidence are used ... (Yin 1984: 23).
Case studies can either involve single or multiple cases and numerous levels of analysis
(Yin 1989). Case studies can be used to provide descriptions or test hypotheses (Gomm,
Hammarsley and Foster 2000). TeJlis (1997) also points out that case studies provide an
ideal methodology when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed. For the purpose of
this study, the case study approach was used to investigate the role of donors in the
establishment, implementation and sustainability of MCTs in Africa. This was achieved
by conducting an in-depth investigation of the management and support structures of the
three cases under review. This involved identifying key areas of success and failure in the
three cases.
Although the case study approach has a number of drawbacks, it also has some
distinctive advantages. One of the disadvantages is that the case study methodology
provides no ground for generalisation of results (Soy 1996). Tellis (1997), adds that
another problem with case studies is the difficulty in separating meaning from location.
In other words, it is difficult to determine whether or not the performance of the
phenomenon is directly linked to the nature of its context. However, the case study
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method's strength lies in its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence such as
documents, questionnaires, artifacts, interviews and observation (Yin 1989).
3.2.2 Criteria for selecting the cases
As noted above, this study will be based on three case studies, namely Nakaseke MCT in
Uganda, Bahamshela MCT in South Africa and the MRTP which was never implemented
in Malawi. This mix of the cases was chosen deliberately to make comparisons and to
ensure that a variety of experiences may be captured. The primary criteria for selecting
the cases included: evidence of donor funding, rural context, the multiplicity of services
and community ownership. All the three projects listed above satisfy these requirements
(see Chapter 1). However, there are also more profound reasons why these projects were
chosen.
Nakaseke MCT is generally seen as a relative success story by many observers in this
field (Benjamin and Dahms 1999; Mayanja 1999; Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003: 70-
83). In that sense, it tends to support the view that telecentres can be useful for
development in a rural setting (Mayanja 1999). The researcher, therefore, deemed it an
ideal and compelling case especially given the comparative nature of this study.
Bhamshela caught the attention of the researcher, firstly, because other researchers who
conducted their studies at the telecentre in the past also live within the vicinity of UKZN.
For instance, Schreiner (1998) and Burton (2002) used Bhamshela as a research case and
both of them still live in the Pietermaritzburg area. This encouraged this researcher to
follow their lead. Secondly, Bhamshela's lacklustre performance over the years made it
an interesting case for the researcher, as it also suited the comparative purposes of the
study.
Regarding the MRTP, the project was chosen, first and foremost, because it is close to the
researcher's heart. As a concerned Malawian who appreciates that modern leTs can
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provide solutions to local development problems, the researcher was eager to find out
why the project simply fizzled out without explanation after it had been announced with a
lot of hype and fanfare by the Government in 2002. Secondly, the researcher hoped that
the results of the study would assist him to understand why there were still no donor-
funded telecentres in Malawi while all its neighbours had these facilities. Finally, the
researcher believed that the results of the study would provide critical information that
would be helpful for future telecentre implementation initiatives in Malawi.
3.3 Research population
The research population is considered a critical part of any research, including an
exploratory one. A "population" consists of all elements or units about whom the study's
information is collected (Leedy 1980: 98). Busha and Harter (1980: 55-57) add that a
population comprises any set of persons or objects that possess at least one common
characteristic and that "a population can be very large or small, depending upon the size
of persons or objects from which the researcher plans to make inference".
The population of this study was selected purposively mainly because the individuals
would be knowledgeable about the research questions. The population, therefore,
consisted of senior officers within the organisations that pledged financial and technical
support for the MRTP and those that funded the Bhamshela and Nakaseke MCTs.
However, as will be explained in more detail later in the Chapter, donor representatives
for the Nakaseke MCT never responded to the questionnaires emailed to them by the
researcher even after numerous reminders. Thus, in the end, the population of this study
consisted of three individuals. These were two senior officials from UNOP in Malawi for
the MRTP case and a senior official from USA in South Africa for the Bhamshela case.
However, given that the researcher spent some time in Malawi, other local role players
who were directly involved with the MRTP case were approached for their perspectives
on the role their organisations played in the project. These role players included a senior
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government official from the Ministry of Information, a representative of MACRA, the
executing agency for the MRTP case and a representative of a local ICT firm that
conducted the feasibility study for the MRTP case on behalf of the donors. By virtue of
their high-ranking positions, these individuals were able to answer questions concerning
their organisation's involvement with the project (Locke et al 1998: 21). However, these
local role players were not part of the population for this study. The researcher also had
the privilege of personal communication with Burton (2005) and Schreiner (2006) in light
of their previous involvement with the Bhamshela case (see Section 3.2.2 above). The
two researchers, too, were not part of the population of the study.
3.4 Data collection methods
Data for the MRTP case was collected using in-depth interviews as well as from the
literature whereas information for the Bhamshela case was gathered through an email
questionnaire and from the literature. However, since donors for the Nakaseke case did
not respond to the questionnaire which the researcher had emailed them, information for
the case was solely sourced from the literature. A protocol of questions was also used as a
guide to interview local partners of the MRTP case. Thus, the researcher interviewed
both the representative from government and the representative from MACRA. Due to
time constraints, however, the representative of the organisation which conducted the
MRTP feasibility study chose to provide the final report of the feasibility study instead of
answering questions from the researcher. A summary of this final report appears in
Chapter 4 of this study. Informal interviews were also conducted with Burton (2005) and
Schreiner (2006) in which the two researchers were asked to comment on various issues
concerning Bhamshela MCT based on their previous experience of the case. This use of
more than one data gathering instrument, commonly known as triangulation, was
considered vital for this study especially given the under-researched and unique nature of
this study (Ngulube 2002).
The above explanation means that two main research instruments were developed for this
study. The first one, (Appendix C) was an email questionnaire, focusing on the Nakaseke
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and Bhamshela cases whose donors could not be reached in person while the second one,
an interview schedule (Appendix D), was used for the face-to-face interviews for donor
representatives of the MRTP case. However, the researcher decided to design a third
minor protocol of questions (Appendix E), targeting local role players of the MRTP
during the research trip to Malawi, as indicated earlier. In an attempt to simplify the
survey and possibly increase the response rate, only six broad questions were asked in
Appendix C, four in Appendix D and four in Appendix E. The instruments were
developed using the literature focusing on the establishment, implementation and
sustainability of donor-funded telecentres in rural communities. The instruments targeted
different aspects of the above-mentioned process and they included the following:
• Telecentre establishment: aimed at determining how the cases were conceived and
planned.
• Telecentre implementation: focused on the elements that informed the
establishment of the three case studies.
• Telecentre sustainability: examined the whole process of ownership, management
and evaluation of the three case studies.
3.4.1 Face-to-face interviews
Also known as in-depth interviews, face-to-face interviews are usually designed to collect
qualitative information from a small sized sample. According to the World Bank Group
(2000), "in-depth interviewing entails asking questions, listening to and recording the
answers and then posing additional questions to clarify or expand on a particular issue".
Interviews were conducted by the researcher in Malawi with two resident representatives
from UNDP, one of the donor organisations which pledged financial and technical
support for the MRTP, using the main interview schedule (Appendix D). The rest of the
organisations which pledged support for the project, namely UNIDO, UNEP and ITU,
did not have resident representatives in the country which meant that the researcher was
unable to get their perspective (the researcher later emailed Appendix C to the three
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organisations but to no avail). The minor interview protocol (Appendix E) was used to
pose questions to local role-players of the project. These were a senior representative
from the Government department directly involved with the MRTP and a senior
representative from MACRA. As noted earlier, the representative from the firm which
conducted the feasibility study for the project waived her right to be interviewed and
instead provided the researcher with a copy of the final report of the feasibility study. All
respondents were key informants with senior positions in their respective institutions.
Since all the questions were open-ended, it meant the answers were extensive and writing
them down could have taken a lot of time. Thus, the interviews were all tape-recorded
and later transcribed. The advantages of using interviews are that they are flexible and
also offer a detailed amount of data (Ooyle 200 I). In addition, the interviewer can build a
healthy rapport with respondents and the nature of the response is not limited. However,
interviews have their own disadvantages. Turban (1997), for example, notes that open-
ended interviews are more like a conversation dominated by one person (informant). The
information from the informant may be vast, sometimes irrelevant and, thus, difficult for
the interviewer to unravel.
3.4.2 Email questionnaire
The questionnaires for this study were emailed to senior representatives of the donor
organisations, which funded both the Nakaseke and Bhamshela Telecentres. Despite its
notoriety for a poor response rate (Salant and Oillman 1994), a questionnaire was deemed
both convenient and cost-effective for this study in terms of time and money.
Six questionnaires were emailed to senior representatives of the donor institutions that
had financed the Nakaseke Telecentre, namely IORC, UNESCO and ITU. The contact
details and rank of these initial contacts were determined from the respective
organisation's website. Thus, two questionnaires were emailed to two senior
representatives from ITU, two to U1\JESCO and two to IORC. With regard to Bhamshela
Telecentre, established with the financial assistance of IORC and USA, three
questionnaires were emailed to senior USA representatives in South Africa, while two
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were sent to IORC. The initial questionnaire was emailed with the individual personal
addresses apparent to all, but the questionnaire was not addressed to the individual
contacts by personal names. After a week, one of the six donor representatives associated
with the Nakaseke Telecentre, specifically, UNESCO replied that his organisation was
not a donor institution and in that sense he was not competent to respond to the
questionnaire (see Appendix G). Surprisingly, senior representatives from UNOP in
Malawi, another UN specialized agency, were very willing to take questions from the
researcher regarding the funding of the MRTP case (see Section 4.2.1). Only one contact
from USA had acknowledged receipt of the questionnaire within the first week and asked
for more time to respond comprehensively to it. Sometime later, two more contacts from
ITU also promised to come back to the researcher at a later date. With the passage of
time, however, nothing more came forth from any of the contacts. Reminders were then
sent to all the initial contacts and two more names for the Nakaseke donor group were
added to the list. This time the email survey went out separately to each individual and
each was addressed personally by name in an attempt to boost the response rate.
The process continued over a period of nearly twelve weeks but, in the end, only one
response from USA for the Bhamshela case was received and none for the Nakaseke
Telecentre. Oue to the limited time available to the researcher, a decision was made to
proceed with the study, despite the non-response for the Nakaseke case. This explains
why more premium has been put on the literature to understand the circumstances around
this particular case. It should be emphasised that the email survey continued for so long
because the researcher wanted to give as much time as possible to the respective donor
organisations to respond to the questionnaire. As noted earlier, the response rate was
dismal and reminder emails went out continuously (see Appendix F). Thus, it was
frustrating for the researcher to find that contacts that had shown initial interest seemed
reluctant to either respond to the questionnaire or give out other people's email addresses.
Eventually, the study proceeded with the sole response received from USA and the
tabulation of the information began.
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3.5 Actual data collection
As noted above, no response was received from the email questionnaires for the
Nakaseke case and only one was received for the Bhamshela case despite waiting and
sending reminders for a period of nearly twelve weeks. As noted earlier, the waiting
period continued for so long because some contacts kept on promising that they would
respond to the questionnaire in due course. However, aJ I the promises never came to any
fruition except for the one response cited above. The email questionnaire was broken into
themes to capture various aspects of telecentre establishment, implementation and
sustainability (See appendix C). This use of themes helped to obtain in-depth information
about the management and support structures of the Bhamshela case. As indicated above,
since there was no response from the donors of the Nakaseke Telecentre, all the data
relating to the case was solely sourced from the literature (both print and on-line).
On the other hand, the main interview schedule (Appendix D), as well as the minor
protocol of questions (Appendix E), were used to source information for MRTP over and
above any other information obtained from the literature. All the interview questions
were open - ended in nature, which allowed the respondents to express their views on the
role their organisations played in the conceptualisation and lack of implementation of the
MRTP. Follow-up questions were used to get an in-depth response to particular questions
where necessary. The questions were loosely phrased in such a way that they captured
various aspects of telecentre establishment, implementation and sustainability. This
helped the researcher to obtain in-depth information about the management and support
structures of the case.
3.6 Data analysis procedures
Data from the interviews and the questionnaire was qualitative in nature. After
transcribing the tapes and compiling notes from the questionnaire, data was organised by
themes. In this study, content analysis was used to analyse data collected on the cases.
Content analysis involves the systematic collection and organisation of information in a
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standard format that allows analysts to draw conclusions about the characteristics and
meaning of recorded material (Alreck and Settle 1995: 271). According to Babbie and
Mouton (200 I: 383), the technique can be applied to any form of communication. In this
study, the first step in content analysis entailed the construction of categories (Sarantakos
1998: 281). In that light, data was analysed according to themes such as donor policies,
telecentre sustainability, community ownership and strategic partnerships. Categories
were coded and dominant themes and trends were identified. In order to satisfy the
criteria of reliability regarding the field data, the tape recordings were listened to while
notes were made from the questionnaire information in order to find commonality on the
themes or patterns emerging from the data.
3.7 Evaluation of research methodology
The study employed the exploratory research design, utilising the case study approach.
This research design was deemed appropriate in the examination of the role of donors in
the three case studies. Although the methodology used in this study does not allow the
results to be generalised, the study still gives an in-depth analysis into the phenomenon
under investigation. The problems associated with this methodology have revealed some
important insights, which researchers in this field need to bear in mind.
Firstly, the dismal response rate and the amount of time taken to conduct a successful
email survey might not make it the best option for investigating the role of donors in the
establishment, implementation and sustainability of telecentre projects in Africa. This is
not to suggest that the potential respondents for this study would have responded
positively to a more traditional questionnaire posted via "snail" mail. However, although
it is more time consuming and even expensive, this study has shown that face-to-face
interviews remain a viable option for conducting a research of this nature. Owing to the
high costs involved, though, this option was not a consideration in this study.
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Secondly, the study has shown that the expenditure of time used during a face-to-face
interview session can be viewed as an entirely productive use of that time. In contrast,
time spent conducting the email survey was spent on survey reminders and solicitation of
email addresses that probably could have been resolved more quickly by direct face-to-
face contact with the potential respondent.
Finally, the study also showed that the benefit of a comprehensive explanation is a clear
advantage of face-to-face interviews that cannot be overlooked. Respondents to the email
survey simply provided empty promises to the reminders sent by the researcher.
Although follow-up emails were continuously sent to the contacts, the communication
was always brief and abstract. In sum, using email to gather information proved to be the
most time consuming and frustrating activity for this study. Even participants who
showed initial enthusiasm and interest were often reluctant to give out another person's
email address. It would be useful for future research to examine that tendency, but the
present study has clearly shown that conducting a survey using an email questionnaire
can be an arduous and protracted exercise and may be not worth the effort. Perhaps
respondents feel more comfortable giving out another person's name in a verbal, face-to-
face meeting rather than sending it over electronically. Thus, based on the two surveys, a
face-to-face interview appears to be the better value when taking the time to conduct a
study of this nature than the email survey.
3.8 Summary
This Chapter presented the methodology that was used to examine the role of donors in
the establishment, implementation and sustainability of MCTs in Africa, with special
reference to the three case studies under review. An exploratory research design was
considered appropriate for this study. Two senior representatives from the UNDP in
Malawi, one of the organisations which pledged support for the MRTP case and one
senior officer from USA in South Africa, financiers of the Bhamshela MCT, constituted
the population of this study. The Chapter then discussed the data collection methods, data
analysis procedures before evaluating the research methodology.
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CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The structure of this Chapter is as follows: Section 4.1 introduces the Chapter. Section
4.2 presents the research results of the Bhamshela and MRTP cases while Section 4.3
presents the results of the Nakaseke case. Analysis of the research results is done in
Section 4.4. Section 4.5 summarises the Chapter
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this Chapter is to present the research results and to analyse the issues that
emerged in the course of conducting open-ended interviews and the email survey. The
nature of this study is qualitative and although the results may not be generalized
statistically, they do raise a better understanding of the role of donors in the
establishment, implementation and sustainability of telecentres in the three case studies
which were the focus of the study. The research questions were as follows:
a. What is the role of donor policies in telecentre projects in Africa, specifically
in terms of the key areas of success and reasons of failure (if any), for the
three case studies?
b. How can donor-funded telecentres provide a sustainable way of providing
universal access to ICTs and what are the conditions that must be met to make
them sustainable?
c. To what extent does the donor-funded telecentre model engender community
ownership and the moulding of local champions?
d. What are the dynamics of collaborative local needs and skills assessment
between the project donors, the project proposers and the local community
actors and how does this collaboration or lack thereof, affect the management
of the telecentre?
e. What are the key success factors for a sustainable donor-funded telecentre?
Based upon these five research questions, three research instruments were devised with a
view to providing answers to these questions (see Section 3.4). This Chapter, therefore, is
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organ ised into two sections. The first section presents research results of both the face-to-
face interviews and email questionnaire. An abridged version of the final report of the
feasibility study for the MRTP case will also be presented. This will be followed by the
researcher's own comments to the presented results. The second section will then
interpret and make further comments on the research results (see Section 4.4).
4.2 Presentation of results
In this section, face-to-face interview results will be presented and they will be followed
by email questionnaire results.
4.2.1 Face-to-face interview results
The main interview schedule (Appendix 0) was used to conduct face-to-face interviews
with two senior representatives from UNOP, one of the donor organisations which
pledged financial and technical support for the MRTP. Interviews were also conducted
with one senior official from the Ministry of Information and with one senior official
from MACRA, the implementing agency on the ground using the minor protocol of
questions (Appendix E). Representatives from three other co-donors for the project,
namely LlNIOO, UNEP and ITU, were unavailable because they have no resident
representation in the country. The purpose of conducting these interviews was based on
the assumption that the respondents were knowledgeable of the dynamics that informed
the conceptualization and lack of implementation of the MRTP case.
The following, therefore, are the results of the face-to-face interviews that the researcher
conducted:
4.2.1.1 Role of donors and local stakeholders in the MRTP
Respondents were asked to explain their organisation's role in the MRTP.
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The two respondents from the UNDP explained that their organisation has, over the
years, always been one of the institutions promoting ideas, which have great potential for
sustainable human development. They noted that back in the 1990s, their organisation
and other agencies introduced the Sustainable Development Programme (SDP) in a
number of countries. That programme involves countries, which do not have, or are seen
to be lagging behind, in the field of Internet services and Malawi was identified as one of
them. The idea then, was that Malawi should have means to access information on
environmental issues and in other areas of development. Hence, a global fund was
established by the organization to initiate such activities in various developing countries
targeted by the SDP.
In early 2000, Malawi presented a project proposal to the organization through the
Ministry of Information and MACRA. The proposal requested the organization to assist
the Malawian Government to promote communication between the rural areas and the
urban centers through MCTs. According to the respondents, Internet connectivity was
identified as one of the core mediums of communication needing exploration (other
media were radio, newspapers and television). The idea was to identify centres in the
rural areas where the project would introduce these tools of communication and let these
technologies assist in the promotion of business, health, civic education and other social
aspects. It was on the basis of this proposal that the organization, in partnership with
other donor organizations, pledged both financial and technical support to the
Government for the MRTP initiative.
The respondent from MACRA explained that his organisation assisted the Ministry of
Information in proposing for the MRTP and helped to seek financial and technical
assistance from ITU and UNIDO. UNIDO was also asked to fund the feasibility study for
the project. MACRA was, thus, the local executing agency of the MRTP. The respondent
explained that in 2002, a pre-feasibility study was done in seven Rural Growth Centres
(RGCs) out of which three were identified for further study. The three RGCs were in
Mwanza, Kasungu and Karonga districts. A Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) was done in
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the three districts and identified the following project locations: Mwanza-Kanduku,
Kasungu-Mphepo and Karonga-Lupaso. Comprehensive market research was later
conducted in the above-mentioned areas. Thereafter, a complete project document was
released which was used in seeking funds for implementation of the project.
The senior official from the Ministry of Information stated that Government's principal
role in the MRTP was to address the issue of the Rural Telecommunications Policy which
would provide the regulatory framework for the project. According to the respondent, this
policy would also provide a conducive environment for the implementation of the
Universal Access Fund (UAF) whose main purpose was to fund telecommunication
development in marginalized communities through MACRA. The official explained that
MACRA would source the money for the fund from the penalties it charged national
telecommunication operators who were in breach of the Communications Act.
4.2.1.2 Non implementation of the MRTP
Respondents were asked to identify the main issues that prevented the implementation of
the MRTP.
The donor representatives answered that the most important reason was a lack of finance.
They noted that the initiative was not backed by immediate financial resources due to a
number of reasons. The respondents explained that there was some hesitation on the part
of donors to immediately invest in the MRTP due to the poor infrastructure that existed in
Malawi at that time. The respondents noted further that their organisation was not certain
about the long-term sustainability of the project. They noted that it was risky to put
telecentres in rural settings where poverty and illiteracy were pervasive. So while the
donors were convinced of the need for the telecentres in those areas, they were still not
sure whether there were adequate mechanisms in place, which could have helped the user
communities to support the project on a viable basis.
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Surprisingly, the respondent from MACRA, the executing agency on the ground,
answered that the MRTP has not yet reached the implementation stage. According to the
respondent, the project is still work in progress and an agreement with donors is expected
to be reached within the first half of 2006. Thereafter, the project is expected to be
implemented.
The respondent from the Ministry of Information had a different take on the matter. He
noted that no one had a clear idea on how to implement the project. According to him, the
main donor organization, UNDP, expressed its disinterest to fund the project in 2002 and
advised government to rather seek funding from the private sector. The other donor
organizations, namely UNIDO and UNEP, immediately followed suit, citing poor
infrastructure and lack of appropriate policy as some of the factors that would make the
project unviable. He noted, however, that Government found the donors' excuses
unconvincing since there were other infrastructure intensive projects, funded by similar
multilateral donors that were running parallel to the MRTP initiative. He was of the
opinion that the reasons why donors had withdrawn from the project had to do with
allegations of corruption leveled against the then Government.
The respondent conceded, however, that while Malawi has a Communications Act to
regulate telecommunication operations In the country, there was no rural
telecommunications policy that could guide the development of donor funded telecentre
projects in rural communities. He explained that the 1998 Communications Act was
indeed inadequate since it was developed at a time when the telecentre phenomenon was
relatively unknown in Africa. He added that it was for this reason that the draft Rural
Telecommunications Policy, meant to comprehensively cover all telecentre matters
especially in rural areas, was already at the cabinet level for appraisal and possible
approval.
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4.2.1.3 Lessons learned from MRTP
Respondents were asked to point out lessons that emerged from the project. These
focused on implementation issues that could be useful in similar future projects in the
country.
Respondents from the donor organization replied that a reliable infrastructure in the
country is essential if any future telecentre project is to be viable. They also noted that
Malawi does not have a clear telecentre policy, something, which they felt, should be
addressed quickly. They added that project ownership ought to be prioritized and this
would be achieved by involving the target communities at every stage of the project.
Lastly, they noted that mechanisms to ensure project sustainability, once external funding
has stopped, should be clearly spelt out in the implementation plans of the project.
The respondent from MACRA noted that critical lessons had been learnt from the
UNIDO funded feasibility study to the extent that the organisation had identified another
potential area for a pilot telecenter project in the Goliati area, Thyolo district. According
to the respondent, MACRA was doing a feasibility study in the area and market research
had already been conducted.
According to the respondent from Government, the way forward for telecentres in the
country would be to move away from donor-funded telecentres. He was of the opinion
that Government should rather provide subsidies to private entrepreneurs to run
telecentres in marginalized communities on a commercial basis. The respondent
explained that this scenario envisaged a situation where, for example, an interested
businessman/woman would get a loan from a bank at special rates subsidised by the
Government. The entrepreneur would then invest in telephone lines in a specific area at
lower than market prices and some of these lines would go into a telecentre. Government
subsidies would then cover the difference to ensure profitability to the telecommunication
operator. According to the respondent, the Government's principal role in this
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arrangement would be either to pay the subsidies to the telecommunications operator or
as guarantor to the loans from the banks taken by entrepreneurs investing in telecentres.
4.2.1.4 Additional issues
Respondents were asked to raise any other issues concerning the concept oftelecentre
initiatives in Malawi.
Respondents from the donor organisation observed that new information and
communications technologies, in particular the Internet, offer a potentially powerful tool
for contributing to rural development. However, they noted that the introduction of these
technologies into rural settings through telecentres in Malawi would inevitably be
hampered by many of the same constraints and difficulties experienced with previous
technology transfer attempts if proper planning is not put in place. They advised that the
experiences of the MRTP should be applied to future telecentre investments in the
country.
On the other hand, the respondent from MACRA observed that the telecenter initiative
had received an overwhelming positive response and welcome in most of the rural areas
of Malawi. According to the respondent, people were eagerly looking forward to the
implementation of telecenter projects in their areas. He added that the telecenter concept
is also being advanced through the cooperation between the Ministry of Education and
various donor organisations. He noted, for example, that there is a proposed project called
"Renewable Energy Promotion through Information and Communication Technology
Introduction in Off-grid Rural Communities". The project aims at establishing telecenters
in off-grid teacher training development centres.
Asked if he had any additional issues to raise on the MRTP case, the respondent from
Government reserved further comment and referred the researcher to MACRA.
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4.2.2 An abridged version of the MRTP feasibility study results (September 2002)
In 2002, a feasibility study for the MRTP was carried out by a reputable local ICT
consulting firm, which was contracted by the project donors. During his research tour to
Malawi, a representative of the firm was approached by the researcher to have her
insights on the MRTP case. However, due to time constraints, she chose only to provide
the feasibility assessment report of the case (Mbvundula 2004). What follows is an
abridged version of the results of the study, which, according to the respondent, was
presented to all stakeholders:
4.2.2.1 Malawi Country Status
According to the report, the study found that:
• Malawi was one of the least developed countries in the world with a population of
eleven million.
• The country was divided into 29 administrative districts, twenty-five of which
were rural.
• 85% of the population lived in the rural areas and in abject poverty.
• The majority of the rural population traveled great distances to access the few
phones available in the rural areas.
• There were minimal ICTs in the rural areas.
• Low literacy levels were prevalent across the country.
• Literacy levels in indigenous tongues were higher than literacy in English.
4.2.2.2 The Malawi Rural Telecentre Project
The project was a collaboration between government and international donors. Thus, the
study endorsed the donors' objectives to:
• Establish seven pilot rural MCTs in the country.
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• Identify local partners to operate the MCTs to reduce operational and startup
costs.
• Identify secure premises.
• Facilitate a competitive public tender for the provision of ICT infrastructure,
technical support and telecentre management system.
• Market the concept and services to the community to ensure project ownership
and sustainability.
4.2.2.3 Telecommunications sector
The feasibility report shows that:
• Telecommunications growth at that time had been below average for Malawi
(4.1% versus 6.9% for Africa).
• There were 59,000 fixed subscribers compared to 83,000 mobile subscribers.
• 1.3% of the population had access to a fixed/mobile phone. 45% of fixed lines
were in urban areas.
• MTL was the sole fixed line telecommunications operator.
4.2.2.4 leT Policies in Malawi
At the time of the preparation of the report, the study found that:
• The telecommunications sector in the country was being regulated by the
Telecommunications Act of 1998.
• The Rural Telecommunications Policy (RTP) was still awaiting final Government
approval at the time the report was being prepared. Its goal was to enable 80% of
the population to access a phone within 5km.
• The national ICT Policy, meant to review the socio-economic impact of ICTs in
the country, was sti II awaiting final Government approval.
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4.2.2.5 Key Issues
The study identified three key issues necessary to underpin the project which were:
I. Donors should provide a minimum set of ICT services for the project and ensure
scalability and sustainability after project funds had ended.
2. Donors should ensure appropriate content is available. Appropriate content in this
regard meant information, which was relevant to the needs of the communities.
3. Donors should encourage cross gender involvement in all aspects of the
telecentre.
4.2.2.6 How success would be guaranteed
According to the study, project success would, among other things, be guaranteed if









The need for relevant content was emphasized in the feasibility study. According to the





• Information on social issues.





• Content in indigenous languages.
• NGO information.
4.2.2.8 Information Services
The study advised that the telecentre should, among other things, offer the following
information services:
• Make Government documentation easily available and accessible to the target
communities.
• Micro-finance information.
• HIV/AIDS awareness messages.
• Educational material.
• Agricultural produce prices.
• Make provisions to use the MCT to support the requirements of the communities.
• Analysis of user information needs.
4.2.2.9 Beneficiaries of the project







• Students and the youth.
• Entrepreneurs.
It needs to be emphasised that the feasibility study was fully funded by donors and was
finalized and presented to all stakeholders in September 2002.
As noted in the opening Chapter of this study, the announcement of the MRTP was met
with great expectations from both the government and target communities, although its
non-implementation was never fully explained to Malawians. However, careful analysis
of the data gathered for this case reveals that the MRTP could have been hampered, right
from the outset, by the following factors:
• An un-enabling policy environment (see Sections 1.7.3 and 4.2.2.4).
• Poor telecommunications infrastructure (Sections 1.7.3 and 4.2.2.3).
• Erratic power supply (Section 1.7.3).
• Widespread poverty especially in rural areas due to high unemployment levels
(Sections 1.7.3 and 4.2.2.1).
• High illiteracy levels (Sections 1.7.3 and 4.2.2. I).
It is safe to infer, therefore, that the above mentioned factors, common threads in all the
collected data for the MRTP case, must have alerted the project donors to the reality that,
while providing phone services could be done within the market, providing Internet
services could not. It must also have been clear to the project donors, possibly on the
basis of the results of the feasibility study, that other ICT-related services such as CV
typing and faxing needed to be combined with other services, whether ICT-related or not,
to make them sustainable.
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Secondly, it is clear from the data collected for the MRTP case that finding employment
would be the first priority for most people in Malawi, especially in rural areas, and a gap
between skill levels and the requirements of formal-sector jobs could be a large
contributing factor to unemployment (see Section 4.2.2.1). Yet there are relatively few
services in place to address this. Thus, the lack of implementation of the MRTP by its
donors, a project which could have potentially addressed the local need for ICT training
in rural areas and possibly harness ICTs for local entrepreneurial opportunities and
employment, is understandable. The donors quickly noted the unviability of the project
owing to the high costs of telecommunication services which could have been
unaffordable to the rural masses suffering from the dual scourges of unemployment and
poverty (See 1.7.3 and 4.2.2.1).
4.2.3 Email questionnaire results
The following are the results of the email questionnaire that the researcher received from
the single respondent on the Bhamshela case:
4.2.3.1 The role of the donor in the establishment of Bhamshela Telecentre
The respondent was asked to explain the role of the USA in the establ ishment of
Bhamshela Telecentre.
The respondent explained that her organisation was established in accordance with the
1996 Telecommunications Act No 103 as amended in 2001. It was established to
promote the goals of universal access and services in under-serviced areas where 60% of
the South African population resides. The respondent stated that under-serviced and
impoverished communities live mainly in rural and peri-urban areas where levels of
poverty are high, infrastructure is poor, and access to basic services is limited.
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According to the respondent, the same Telecommunications Act mandated her
organisation to establish a Universal Service Fund (USF). The telecommunications
operators - namely Telkom, Vodacom, MTN and Cell C, contribute to this fund. The
respondent explained that the USF is meant to be used exclusively for the following:
I. Assist needy persons towards the cost of the provision of
telecommunications services.
11. Finance extensions of telecommunications servIces to areas and
communities that are underserved or unserved.
Ill. Procure Internet services and equipment necessary to access the Internet
for public schools.
IV. Establish centres where access can be obtained to telecommunications
facilities.
v. Assist small business and cooperatives to acquire and construct
infrastructure to provide telecommunications services to areas that are
unserved and underserved.
VI. Facilitate the provision of multimedia services.
VII. Establish public information terminals.
Thus, from 1998, the organisation has been involved in establishing telecentres
nationwide including the Bhamshela Telecentre. The respondent concluded that this
mandate still continues which is to fund and establish telecentres in communities, and
cyberlabs for schools so that they may all gain access to ICTs and the Internet.
4.2.3.2 The role of donors in the scope of Bhamshela Telecentre
The respondent was asked to define the donor's role in the scope of the Telecentre
project.
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The respondent replied that at the time of establishment, the Telecentre aimed at
providing the following services:
• Computer services.
• Voice (telephones).
• Data (fax machines, Internet, and email).
• Video (CD - Rom).
• Typing, printing and photocopying facilities.
The respondent noted further that Bhamshela is what is known as a Multi-Purpose
Community Telecentre, which is a teJecentre that provides ICT facilities within a Multi-
Purpose Community Centre (MPCC). MPCCs are rolled out by the Government
Communication Information Services (GCIS) as part of a "one stop development service"
within a community. Telecentres are, in this case, part of a wider service offered within
the facility some of which can include a clinic, postal agency, and Home Affairs office
and social services, and access to other government services and information.
4.2.3.3 The role of donors in site identification
The respondent was asked to explain the role of the donors in the identification of
Bhamshela as a site for this project.
The respondent explained that her organisation has Provincial Coordinators nationwide
who are individually responsible for their respective provinces, and enable the
organisation to keep abreast with all that is happening across the country. Currently there
are six established Provincial Offices - KwaZulu-Natal (Durban), Free State and
Northern Cape (Bloemfontein), Eastern Cape (Bisho), Gauteng, Mpumalanga and North
West (Johannesburg), Limpopo (Polokwane), and one established in the Western Cape.
These Provincial Coordinators are integral to the site identification process. The
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respondent added that Provincial Coordinators do site visits based on the following
criteria:
• Historically under-serviced areas (based on teledensity and Geographic
Information Systems), and rural communities.
• Areas identified in line with the Government's policy thrust known as the
Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Program (ISRDP).
• Other rural areas in general including peri-urban areas.
• Priority in urban areas is given to facilities for Learners with Special Educational
Needs (LSEN). These would include facilities for people with diminished mental
capacity or other physical disabilities.
• Sites for disabled people, women and youth.
The respondent noted that once a site has been identified, the research section of the
organisation embarks on a community profiling and needs assessment takes place. With
regard to community profiling, information is gathered on resources available within the
community. A meeting of the key stakeholders in the community is then set up.
According to the respondent, the community leaders in Bhamshela were involved in the
whole process mentioned above so that the donors could ensure the community's co-
operation. The unique needs of the community were assessed on the following basis:
o Poverty levels.
o Literacy levels.
o Availability of existing structures to house the telecentre (privately owned
buildings are not acceptable).
o What other programs and initiatives were running in the area.
o Whether these initiatives could be enhanced by a telecentre.
o Telecommunication facilities already existing in the community.
o Identification of Not for Profit Organisations and key stakeholders in the
community.
77
a Identification of proposed champions.
4.2.3.4 The role of the donors in preparing the community for the project
The respondent was asked to explain the role of the donors in preparing the community
for the project.
The respondent noted that it is an integral part to the future success of a telecentre that the
future recipients declare their commitment to the spirit and vision of the project. She
added that in most of the identified areas, where her organisation has been involved in,
there was no prior knowledge of the USA or its mandates and programs. The Provincial
Coordinators, therefore, arrange community awareness and mobilisation campaigns in the
target areas. According to the respondent, this can be done by several means:
a Public meetings by the community stakeholders.
a The distribution of flyers and pamphlets.
o Slots on local radio stations.
With regard to Bhamshela, the respondent noted that a public meeting of key identified
stakeholders was set up to introduce her organisation and its activities to the community.
The same meeting also outlined what the proposed plans were for the community. This
was meant to achieve the following objectives:
a To raise the community awareness.
o To outline the process, clarify the roles and expectations of different stakeholdcrs
from start to finish of the rollout.
o To obtain relevant input from the community about its specific needs and
concerns.
o To identify feedback mechanisms.
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D To get the "buy-in" and ownership by aU the people.
4.2.3.5 The role of the donors in the identification and preparation of champions
The respondent was asked to explain the role donors played in the identification and
preparation of project champions.
The respondent replied that the following guidelines are followed for the preparation of
champions at each site:
o Invitation and selection of community organisations.
o Validation of champions to be done after confirmation with stakeholders.
o Champions awareness and education which would include:
• Information about the funding organisation (its mandates, programs and
objectives).
• Explaining the role of ICTs in addressing the development challenges of the
community and specifically the experience of the funding organisation in
establishing telecentres.
• Outlining of the expectations, role and responsibilities of the champions both
in the pre and post rollout periods.
o Establishment of the formal structures of governance:
• Election of the board.
• Registration of the telecentre.
• Induction of the board.
o Profile of the champions.
o Training and development for the champions.
o Business plan for the telecentre.
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• Relationship with the board.
[J Roles and responsibilities of the manager, assistant and volunteers (if any).
4.2.3.6 Strategic partnerships
The respondent was asked whether the organisation had any partners that assisted in its
rollout of the telecentre.
The respondent answered that the organisation had adopted a strategic "partnership"
approach for the successful implementation of its rollouts for telecentres. These
partnerships incorporated the following broad categories:
o Government departments / State enterprises.
o Provincial and Local governments.
o Service providers.
o Private and business sector.
o International donors.
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4.2.3.7 Any other issues
The respondent was asked to raise any other issues that would enhance the establishment,
implementation and sustainability of donor-funded telecentres in Africa.
The respondent replied that it is vital for the success of future donor-funded telecentre
initiatives in Africa that ongoing support and communication channels are maintained
between the donors and the community way beyond the implementation stage. According
to the respondent, further dissemination of information and feedback to the community is
necessary to achieve the following:
• To inform the community of the progress at each stage and the challenges
faced and met.
• To inform all parties involved about the anticipated rollout timeframes and
deliverables.
• To inform all parties about the anticipated launch date and procedures.
• To inform the community about the post rollout support and roles.
• To familiarize the community with post rollout problem solving.
Based on the collected data for this case, the researcher is not convinced that the donors'
decision to introduce an assortment of services at Bhamshela MCT was the best for this
community (see Sections 1.7.2 and 4.2.3.2). Thus, the following problems associated
with the project were identified:
Firstly, the donors should have ensured that the Telecentre was either explicitly wider in
scope to meet its community development services mandate (which would have required
more external funding other than user fees), or it should have simply focused on locally
relevant ICT services. For example, a thorough needs assessment, which the donors claim
was carried out (see Section 4.2.3.3), could easily have shown the high demand for
telephony and the lack of capacity for job-related computer skills which the Telecentre
had subsequently introduced (see Section 1.7.2). What was happening instead was that
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uneconomical services offered by the Telecentre were being subsidized by services in
demand such as telephony, which in turn affected pricing. Since telephony was the
service most in demand, the increased cost on the service became a limiting factor in
terms of accessibility by the community (see Section 1.7.2). Fundamental flaws like these
tend to confirm Schreiner's (2006) claim that, in fact, no needs assessment was ever
carried out at Bhamshela by the donors (see Section 1.7.2).
The fact that donors failed to conduct a thorough community needs assessment at
Bhamshela immediately spawned the second problem: the provision of irrelevant services
such as computer skills training for the formal employment sector. To begin with,
computer classes were never part of the original services envisaged by the Telecentre
planners (see Section 4.2.3.2). This is because the staff did not have the required training
to deliver them and the community could not afford them due to the existing high
unemployment and poverty levels (Section 1.7.2). Thus, resorting to this training service
was not only disingenuous but also a desperate survival strategy on the part of the donors
as they tried to save the telecentre from a downward spiral. The result was that many
students defaulted on their tuition payments because they could not afford them. Again,
this does not appear to have served the community in the best manner. A clear needs
assessment and targeting of resources by the donors (for example, on staff training),
where necessary, could have been better than setting up a clearly unsustainable and
unaffordable service.
Thirdly, the donors only created a further strain on the overall viability of the Telecentre
by offering expensive Internet services where local demand was absent. At the very best,
it was a symbolic gesture and a service to just a handful of people. The lORe (2002)
suggests two basic solutions to the difficult situation in which Bhamshela found itself in:
Bhamshela had to either introduce a different pricing structure on the Internet service so
that local demand could be accommodated and increased over time (implying
subsidisation over the medium term from an external source), or it had to focus the
Telecentre's efforts in areas likely to yield better results which in this case was telephony.
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In conclusion, Bhamshela Telecentre could have been viable and had the potential to be
self-sufficient but it has seemingly been let down by inadequate training and poor
management by the USA (see Section 1.7.2).
4.3 Status of Nakaseke Telecentre based on data from the literature
As noted earlier, information concerning the Nakaseke case was gleaned solely from the
literature (see Chapter 3) since the donor representatives of the case, namely UNDP, ITU
and IORC did not respond to the email questionnaires sent to them by the researcher.
Hence, it is the literature that provides the basis for the following discussion:
The fact that the Nakaseke MCT hosts a multiplicity of modern ICTs apparently turned
out to be a double edged sword for its donors especially at the early stages. While it
inspired a lot of enthusiasm amongst many members of the community, partly out of
sheer curiosity, the MeT also deterred some illiterate members of the community who
could have regarded the initiative as highly esoteric (Section 1.7.1). However, the donor
initiative allowing the localisation of the applications of the MCT to a level
understandable by all community members helped immensely to sell the idea of the
Centre. The identification and moulding of champions within the community also helped
immensely in terms of community ownership and the long-term sustainability of the
project. In brief, this study has shown that the MCT has been positively influenced by the
following factors:
• The zeal and interest of the local champions and the community in general in
making the MCT a sustainable reality (see Section 1.7.1).
• The development of ICT applications in local languages (see Sections 1.7.1 and
2.5.1.7).
• The role of donors in facilitating financial and technical partnerships that have
been forged both at local and international levels which have brought in a lot of
useful support and experience (Section 1.7.1).
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• The creativity and dedication of the staff and stakeholders (Section 1.7.1).
However, the MCT seems to have been constrained by the following factors:
• Poor telecommunications infrastructure (Section 1.7. J).
• Unreliable power supply (Section J.7.1).
• The high rate of illiteracy in the community (Section 1.7.1).
• The scale of the project.
In the final analysis though, the project donors will have been greatly encouraged by the
relatively positive feedback from users as manifested by Joyce Namayanja's testimony of
what the MCT has done for the community (see Section 2.5.1.7).
4.4 Analysis and comment
What follows is the researcher's analysis and comments on the data collected from the
three cases in relation to the objectives of the study. It should be noted that the broad
headings used in this analysis have been derived from the research questions of the study.
4.4.1 Role of donor policies on telecentre projects
Besides providing funding and an administrative push, donor policies can also be
instrumental in producing the human resources that are vital to a teJecentre initiative in
rural areas. This can happen at intemational, regional, national and community levels (see
Section 2.2.1).
For example, at an intemational level, the MRTP donor representatives in this study
disclosed that since the 1990's, their organisation and other related agencies introduced
the SDP initiative in a number of developing countries across the globe. The programme
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targeted countries, which did not have well developed ICT infrastructure that could
support an ICT mediated information exchange across the digital divide. In Malawi, the
organisation's brief was to investigate the possibility of helping the government to
promote communication between the rural areas and the urban centres through MCTs.
The SOP drive, in the end, became the precursor to the MRTP concept (see 4.2.1.1).
Similarly, both the Nakaseke and Bhamshela MCTs were borne out of policy
formulations, especially at the international donor level, that sought to bridge the
international information and knowledge divide between the information rich and the
information poor (see Sections 1.7.1; 1.7.2 and 4.2.3.1).
At the continental level, the African Information Society Initiative launched in Addis
Ababa by various multilateral donors in 1996, as discussed in Section 1.7.1, is a good
example of a regional donor commitment which augers well for the diffusion of ICT
mediated development in Africa through te1ecentres. Ten years on, however, we are yet
to see any significant follow-up support from donors that would actualise the Addis
Ababa declarations across the continent.
On the national level, donor policies have been influential as well. In Uganda, for
example, various donor organisations have provided expertise and funding to make the
Internet affordable both in rural and urban communities across the nation. This arose in
the wake of the 1997 Ugandan Communication Act, which provided for the liberalisation
of the communication sector country. One of the fruits of this national donor commitment
was the establishment of the Nakaseke MCT (see Section 1.7.1). In South Africa,
international organisations, such as IORC, have collaborated with the USA, which has
been the key actor in establishing and funding telecenters in under-served and unserved
rural areas across the country (see Section 1.7.2).
However donor policies can also have a negative influence. For example, the chronic
problems at Bhamshela Telecentre have pushed USA policies under the microscope. As
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noted in Section 1.7.2, the USA had for some time been compromised by a poor
reputation, internal management difficulties and poor relationships with other key
organisations. This, among other things, resulted in a large telephone bill that the
Telecentre could not afford to pay, forcing Telkom to disconnect all telephone lines at the
Telecentre in 2001 (Section 1.7.2). Benjamin (2001), further points out that the USA
"never developed definitions, indicators or benchmarks for any key terms that would
allow it to strategize effectively". In addition, the Agency, "partly in response to political
pressure", moved quickly towards implementing Bhamshela Telecentre without due
regard to any supporting institutions that would provide a clientele base (see section
1.7.2).
In Malawi, one of the major challenges faced by the MRTP was the lack of clear donor
implementation policies regarding the project (see Section 4.2.1.2). This confusion is
borne out by the different reasons given by respondents as to why the project was never
implemented (Section 4.2.1.2). To be fair to the donors, however, there was general
consensus from the respondents of the MRTP case that there was no regulatory policy
that could have facilitated the implementation of telecentres during that period. It did not
help matters that the Rural Telecommunications Policy, which would have assisted
donors in their efforts to develop MCTs in marginalised areas, was still awaiting
government approval (see sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.2.4).
There is no doubt, therefore, that good donor policies can give visibility and help
mobilize resources that can promote access and use of ICTs in Africa while poor donor
policies can achieve the opposite.
4.4.2 The role of donors in community ownership and moulding of local champions
The role of donors in identifying and moulding local "champions" or what Everett
Rogers (1995) calls "innovators", who can mobilize others in the community to accept
the vision of the telecentre initiative cannot be over emphasized. This is critical for the
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project's sustainability once the external funding has ended. This study has shown that
ownership can be promoted if the beneficiary communities contribute to the decisions
made before the telecentre project started (see Section 2.6.1).
As noted in Section 1.7.1, the malO reason "for the extraordinary reputation of the
Nakaseke Telecentre as one of the most active and vibrant in the continent has depended
a lot on the good will and commitment of local political leaders" (Etta and Parvyn-
Wamahiu 2003: 108). The two researchers explain that "these leaders had made
tremendous contributions toward community mobilisation, particularly during the initial
stages of the project" (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003: 108). Thus, community leaders in
Nakaseke, with the encouragement of the project donors, have proved to be true
champions for the cause of the Telecentre. As noted further in Section 1.7.1, these
champions have not only been fighting for the survival of the Telecenter, but they have
also been entertaining new ideas to better serve their community through the use of new
leTs.
Similarly, in Bhamshela, the respondent from USA indicated that laid down guidelines
were followed for the preparation of champions at the site. These included invitation and
selection of community organisations, validation of the champions after confirmation had
been done with stakeholders and champions' awareness and education. The respondent
added that the outlining of the expectations, roles and responsibilities of the champions
during both the pre and post rollout periods were part of the champion identification and
moulding process in order to encourage community ownership of the project (see Section
4.2.3.5).
Based on the above examples, the study has shown that "the obscurity and abstractness of
the Information Society" (Mayanja 2001) requires the zeal of individuals who can
translate and demonstrate the relevance and appl ication of these kinds of concepts to the
realities of the community. Mayanja (2001) further adds that for the innovators to be
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from the community itself increases the credibility of the telecentre initiative. The
professional literature on the diffusion of innovations also underlines the importance of
the innovator. "The innovator," says Rogers, "plays an important role in the diffusion
process: that of launching the new idea in the system by importing the innovation from
outside the system's boundaries and igniting early adopters" (Rogers 1995).
4.4.3 Role of donors in ensuring project sustainability
This study has shown that when selecting locations, donors take into account the level of
potential demand for communication and information services from a large number and a
wide range of users and the viability of the project in the particular area (see Chapter 1).
This ensures maximum utilisation of the facility and through cost sharing, reduces the
expense to individuals (Emberg 1998). In this regard, the location of the Nakaseke MCT
has proved to be spot on. Relative to other telecentres in the country, 61.1 % of the people
in Nakaseke used the Telecentre in 2003 compared to 33.3% of the population around
Bugolobi Telecentre and only 30.0% of those around Nabweru Telecentre (see Section
1.7.2). On the other hand, while the MRTP donors were convinced of the need and
demand for telecentres in rural areas, they were not sure whether there were adequate
infrastructural mechanisms in place that could have helped the user communities to
support the project on a viable basis (see Section 4.2.1.2). The Bhamshela MCT donor
explained that the organisation has Provincial Coordinators nationwide who are
individually responsible for their respective provinces, and enable the organisation to
keep abreast with all that is happening in various provinces across the country (see
Section 4.2.3.3). The implication is that, based on the expert advice of its Provincial
Coordinator, the organisation was satisfied with the user demand, the surrounding
infrastructure and the viability level of the Bhamshela project before they set it up in the
community. Yet, evidence from the literature as well as comments from both Burton
(2005) and Schreiner (2006) suggest otherwise. In fact, the cumulative evidence suggests
that the Telecentre faced various problems right from the start, ranging from poor
management, lack of community needs assessment, inadequate training, unserviceable
equipment to the introduction of irrelevant services (see Section 1.7.2). This suggests
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laxity in the pre-feasibility assessment procedures on the part of the USA's Provincial
Coordinators, a factor that can adversely affect project sustainability.
The study has also shown that to ensure sustainability, donors usually consider the
proximity of other organizations and institutions that can play roles in using, supporting,
maintaining or operating the telecentre. Such organizations might include: health centres,
schools/colleges/universities, community and cultural centres, religious centres, libraries,
organizations of farmers/fishermen/craftsmen, post offices, local/national government
administration offices, radio and television stations, NGOs and community-based
organizations, among others (see Sections 1.7.1 and 1.7.2). Nakaseke MCT, for example,
served not only the local people, but also twenty-four neighbouring primary schools, four
secondary schools, a primary teacher's college and the nearby hospital (Section 1.7.1).
However, this was not the case with Bhamshela MCT which did not have the benefit of
these organizations in its vicinity due to its isolated position. As a stand alone, the
Telecentre had a very narrow clientele base, which meant donors had to raise the cost of
the services quite high to try to keep it on its feet (Section 1.7.2).
Other donor infrastructural considerations that can enhance sustainability that are
highlighted in this study include: a location that is easily accessible to potential users (for
example, near public transport or within walking distance); the availability of an existing
structure (for example a school building, library, extension office and so on) or a new
structure which is suited to use as a telecentre (appropriate layout, secure); access to
electricity; and connection to telephone lines and the Internet (see Chapter 1). At both the
Nakaseke and Bhamshela MCTs, the buildings housing the ICTs were donated by the
communities and renovated to an acceptable level for the project to work in keeping with
the above-mentioned point (see Sections 1.7.1 and 1.7.2).
However, evidence from the collected data shows that problems regarding telephone
connectivity and electricity supply severely affected both projects. In Nakaseke, for
89
example, accessing the Internet was difficult due to the poor quality of the telephone line.
Huge telephone bills were also a constant worry (see 1.7.1). The problem of connectivity
can be identified at Bhamshela as well, where the Telecentre was temporarily closed in
late 2001 due to the disconnection of the phone lines by Telkom owing to a huge unpaid
bill (Section 1.7.2). These problems suggest that in some situations, the development of
MCTs may be inappropriate, and other types of communication solutions, electronic or
otherwise, should be explored by the donors.
Finally, the study has shown that, to ensure project success, donors need to consider the
socio-cultural aspects that may affect the utilisation of the telecentre (see Chapter I). This
is important because, to be effective, telecentres need to be integrated into communities
so that they lessen, instead of widen the communication gaps between the information
rich and the information poor (Ernberg 1998; Subedi and Garforth 200 I). Donors have
seemingly realised that in the face of widespread interest in the "digital divide" debate,
broad-based community participation should become part of the telecenters' mandate.
This is important in order to reach out to ethnic minorities, women, children and the
elderly who are often on the wrong side of that divide especially in Africa. Experts argue
that sometimes the technology or the staffing at a telecentre, or its location may
intimidate those who might benefit from the services (Ernberg 1998). In this context, it is
significant to note that one of the two managers at Bhamshela MCT was a woman (see
Section 1.7.2). Thus, Bhamshela donors paid attention to the communication gaps based
on gender, that often exist and sought to incorporate into the Telecentre management the
different communication patterns that exist between men and women, especially in rural
patriarchal communities. Similarly, the Nakaseke MCT donors sought to give women
recognition by identifying them as one of the Telecentre's core target group (see 1.7.1)
although, as Table 2 shows, its 25.8% female user rate is way below expectations. There
are other factors which can assist donors to ensure project sustainability as discussed
below:
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4.4.3.1 Community awareness building
Just like in many parts in Africa, telecentres were a relatively new phenomenon to many
people in the rural areas that the cases for this study were contextualised. Thus, in a bid to
assist rural people to identify the technological applications, services and content they
may need, donors tend to familiarize the target communities with the uses of the
telecentres, potential applications and the content appropriate for their situations (see
Chapter 4). Ways to accomplish this may include study tours, whereby donors take rural
people to where ICTs already exist. Alternatively, demonstrations of and training with the
technologies in rural areas may be organised (Subedi and Garforth 2001).
Thus, at Nakaseke Telecentre, donors sought to demystify computer communications to
some extent, through training and general awareness programmes organised in
collaboration with a local ICT company. This was partly achieved when donors trained
60 community members in computer communication services at the MCT leading to the
growth ofa core group of skilled people within the local community (see Section 1.7.1).
This core group would later teach other members of the community in ICT usage.
Similarly, at Bhamshela MCT, the respondent noted that a public meeting of key
identified stakeholders was set up to introduce her organisation and its activities to the
community, and also to outline the proposed plans for their community (see Section
4.2.3.4). According to her, ICT usage was covered. Yet, this is at odds with evidence
from the literature, where it is reported that ICTs such as the scanner and the printer
always remained idle whereas email and Internet services were disappointingly
underutilized (see Section 1.7.2).
As Subedi and Garforth (200 I) rightly observe, one of the greatest risks in telecentre
development is that the technology chosen by donors may remain "alien" to the local
community, thus, affecting the community's sense of ownership ofthe telecentre. This of
course limits the effectiveness and sustainability of the initiative. However, this can be
addressed if donors engage the local community in all stages of the development of the
project and through capacity building, which develops the skills of local people to take
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responsibility for the organisation, maintenance and operation of the telecentre once the
external funding has stopped (Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu 2003).
4.4.3.2 Choice of computer applications
Some of the applications that were implemented in the Nakaseke and Bhamshela MCTs
included "generic" content. This would be content found on the Internet and generally
developed outside the community (Mbvundula 2002). However, as the MRTP feasibility
study rightly points out, the most important applications are likely to be those developed
specifically for and by the local users (see 4.2.2.7). This is especially true given the high
levels of illiteracy reported in all the three cases (see Sections 1.7.1; 1.7.2 and 1.7.3).
Thus, this study has shown that donors are increasingly trying to include many segments
of the community, including youth and women, in the development of specialised
applications.
A good example is at Nakaseke MCT where a donor/local community collaboration came
up with a CD-ROM that offers direct access to information for women who are among
the most marginalized in development. The content of the CD-ROM offers a wealth of
information on "best practices" of successful entrepreneurial women, as well as the
"Small business training manual and marketing strategies", developed by OEF and field-
tested extensively among low-income women in Africa. The CD-ROM is currently
available in English and Luganda language versions (see Section 1.7.1). The issue of
"appropriate content" was also emphasized in the feasibility study for the MRTP in
which donors were called upon to ensure that information that is relevant to the target
communities would be made available (Section 4.2.2.7). However, from the data
collected on the Bhamshela case, there is no evidence to suggest that local content was
ever debated or used at the Telecentre.
Yet, as Ernberg (1998) notes, telecentres are not just technology centres; they can also be
"living laboratories", which facilitate local sharing of information and ideas as the
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Nakaseke experience discussed above shows. A telecentre can take full advantage of
expert information from donors as well as facilitate the creation of a common local
development vision. Emberg (1998) concludes that donor-funded telecentres are not only
a means for donors to provide simple, single-point access to external information and
services, but also a facility for local residents and groups to organize village meetings,
video conferences and technology training to address their development needs.
4.4.3.3 The training of telecentre staff and users
Another critical factor that can ensure telecentre sustainability is the issue of training.
Both at the Nakaseke and Bhamshela MCTs, donors rightly incorporated training as a
central component in the management of the projects (see 1.7.1 and 1.7.2). This is
because training is necessary at all stages oftelecentre projects. Yet some of the problems
experienced by the Bhamshela MCT clearly point to inadequate training both for the
Telecentre operators and its users. This is confirmed by Khumalo's (2001) evaluation of
the Telecentre, reported in Section 1.7.2 of this study:
operators cannot accurately record transactions. This is clearly a function of their
training that they received from the USA. For example, they are not able to
generate a shift report neither from the telephone management system nor from
the fax machine. The training was good, but very general. It did not prepare them
for the day-to-day activities of running a telecentre.
In fact, one of the reasons why computer classes failed at the Bhamshela MCT was that
its operators did not have the necessary skills to offer this service (see Sections 1.7.2).
There was also a lack of understanding on responsibilities and obligations by the
Telecentre operators as some of the operators thought that the USA was obliged to pay
their salaries. This confusion could be blamed on poor adminstrative training by the
donors. There is also evidence, as noted earlier, that most of the equipment at Bhamshela
MCT was standing idle because both the operators and the community did not have the
skills to use them (see Section 1.7.2).
The sad scenario at Bhamshela MCT highlights the fact that the provision of ongoing
training by donors for the users of the telecentres and training on an as-needed basis to
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upgrade staff skills is required to meet the changing technology and content requirements
of the telecentres.
4.4.4 Collaborative local needs and skills assessment
A participatory needs assessment between the project donors, the project proposers and
local community actors can help to identify the information and training requirements of
the local population. At the same time, it is important to uncover local skills and
knowledge. These two items help guide donors in the selection and development of
applications and in identifying the technology, which is useful and appropriate for local
people (Mayanja 2001).
Based on the available data, this study cannot say with finality whether or not needs and
skills assessment was actually carried out at the Nakaseke Telecentre. However, the study
can safely infer that no community needs assessment was carried at the Bhamshela case.
This inference is apparent when one notes that a collaborative needs assessment at the
Telecentre could easily have identified the lack of demand for some services which the
MCT was offering (see 1.7.2). The result was that the uneconomical services offered at
the Telecentre (computer classes and Internet) were being subsidised by a service very
much in demand (telephony), which in turn affected the pricing of the latter. However,
even though low Internet and cmail usage is also reported at Nakaseke MCT (Section
1.7. t), coUaborative efforts were made by the donors and the local community to improve
the situation by coming up with applications that are in the local Luganda language (see
Sections 1.7.1; 2.5.1.7).
Ernberg (1998) says that good techniques for needs assessment can be easily developed
and used according to specific situations. The time required for the assessment will vary
depending on factors such as the availability of existing information about the proposed
telecentre location, the depth of information required in the planning stage of the
telecentre, and the level of use of ICTs at the proposed location (Ernberg 1998).
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4.4.5 Participatory monitoring and evaluation
Finally, it is also important for donors, in collaboration with all stakeholders and the local
community, to monitor and evaluate the process of telecentre development and
implementation. The elements monitored should not only include the number of users
and the telecentre services that are most utilised, but also the impact of the telecentre on
the quality of life in rural areas (see Section 2.6.3).
An evaluation carried by Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu (2003: 83) at Nakaseke Telecentre,
for example, reveals that Internet and email services were the least utilised services at the
Center (see Section 1.7.1). The two evaluators attributed this to poor electricity and
expensive connectivity while Dagron (2001) believed at the time that the Internet was
still not relevant to the people's daily lives. Dagron's (2001) argument seems more
plausible given that the subsequent establishment of content specifically designed for
local users at the telecentre was embraced with great enthusiasm (see Sections 1.7.1;
2.5.1.7.).
At Bhamshela, an internal evaluation carried out by Khumalo (200 I) also cites the
underutilisation of the Internet and email services. Khumalo attributes this to three things:
firstly, the operators' and users' incompetence in using Internet/email; secondly, most
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) did not have local points of presence (POPs) and
thirdly, access was relatively expensive and the software installed on most computers was
inappropriate (see Section 1.7.2). The evaluation also revealed the lack of understanding
of the responsibilities and obligations between the operators and the donors, which could
have affected morale. For example, as mentioned in Section 1.7.2, some operators at the
Telecentre thought that the USA had to pay their salaries. Yet, according to Khumalo
(2001) this could have been against the USA's own policy, a situation that reveals lack of
adequate communication between the USA and the representatives of the telecentre
organisation (see Section 1.7.2).
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The experience of Nakaseke, as cited above, shows that donors can make modifications
in the mode of operation, content, the services provided and the technology used at the
telecentre since these will evolve over time. Although this is true for many donor
projects, it is particularly pertinent to donor-funded telecentres, which usually employ
new and rapidly changing lCTs.
4.5 Summary
This Chapter presented and analysed the data collected by the two malO research
instruments, namely an email questionnaire for the Nakaseke and BhamsheJa cases
(Appendix C) and an interview schedule for the MRTP case (Appendix D), as well as a
third minor protocol of questions (Appendix E) used to collect data from local role
players of the MRTP. An abridged version of the feasibility report for the MRTP case
was also presented and analysed.
It should be emphasized, however, that while the face-to-face interviews progressed
relatively smoothly to collect constructive and valuable data, the emaiJ questionnaire
yielded only one response from a representative from USA, the donor of the Bhamshela
MCT. This means that a productive and exhaustive dialogue about the role of donors in
the Nakaseke case could not be achieved using email forcing the researcher to rely solely
on literature (see Chapter 3).
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This Chapter is laid out as follows: Section 5.1 reviews the research purpose and
objectives. An overview of the study follows in Section 5.2 while key findings are
presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 will give the main conclusions drawn from the study
followed by recommendations in Section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6 will come up with
suggestions for further research.
5.1 Review of research purpose and objectives
The purpose of the study was to investigate the role of donors in the establishment,
implementation and sustainability of donor-funded telecentres in Africa. This was
achieved by looking at success factors and reasons of failure at three donor-funded
telecentres across three countries on the continent. The projects in question were
Nakaseke Telecentre in Uganda, Bhamshela Telecentre in South Africa and the MRTP in
Malawi. The objectives of the study were:
• To determine the role of donor policies in telecentre projects in Africa by looking
at the key areas of success and reasons for failure (if any) at the three case studies
under review.
• To explore whether donor-funded telecentres provide a sustainable way of
providing universal access to JCTs and determine the conditions that must be met
to make them sustainable.
• To determine the extent to which the donor-funded telecentre model can engender
community ownership and the moulding of local heroes.
• To explore the dynamics of strategic partnerships between the project donors, the
project proposers and local community actors and assess how this partnership, or
lack thereof, affects the management of the telecentre.
• Based on the findings of the study, to recommend key success factors for
sustainable donor-funded telecentres in Africa.
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5.2 Overview of the study
Chapter I identified and defined the problem of the study, namely investigating the role
of donors in the establishment, implementation and sustainability of donor-funded
telecentre projects in Africa. It provided a detailed account of what the study would cover
and how it would approach the research problem. Key concepts were defined in order to
acquaint the reader with the research. The Chapter then presented the research objectives
and questions. The Chapter also provided the background information regarding the three
donor-funded telecentres which were the focus of this study. Finally, the Chapter
established the justification, scope and limitations of the study.
Chapter 2 presented a review of the theory of donor aid in Africa in terms of its
emergence and approaches. The Chapter then discussed and analysed available research
on the concept of donor aid in Africa in its broadest sense before focusing on donor-
funded telecentre projects on the continent. The role played by the donors in the actual
establishment and management of these projects was also examined.
Chapter 3 detailed the research design and methodology underpinning the study and
explained the basis upon which it was chosen. The criteria for choosing the case studies
were also explained. The Chapter then provided detailed information about the
population used in the study, as well as the research instruments used to gather
information from the population. Finally, the Chapter provided the data analysis
procedures before evaluating the research methodology.
Chapter 4 presented, interpreted and discussed the results of the study with reference to
the background information regarding the three case studies discussed in Chapter I, with
reference to literature review in Chapter 2 and the objectives outlined in Chapter 1.
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5.3 Key findings
The key findings for this study were as follows:
• Africa depends heavi lyon external finance and expertise to establish MCTs
because of its lack of financial capacity, technical know-how and infrastructure to
establish and implement such expensive projects (see Section 1.3). Consequently,
African countries have sometimes tended to bear the full burden of bad planning
due to top - down management policies used by donors (see Section 4.4.1).
Problems at Bhamshela Telecentre can be largely ascribed to such poor
management policies by the donors. However, the Nakaseke donors can be
credited for their foresight and proactive management policies both of which have
ensured the relative success of the Telecentre (see Section 3.2.2). Meanwhile,
MRTP donors can, partly, be held responsible for the non-implementation of the
project due to their lack of clarity regarding their project implementation policies
(see 4.2.1.2).
• The various experiences from the three cases clearly demonstrate that donors
cannot apply a single model of implementation uniformly across the region due to
varying political and socio-economic realities. On the contrary, relative success
stories, like those from Nakaseke Telecentre, have largely been based on factors
such as collaborative and participatory mechanisms. These enabled the
community and other role players to have a strong input into the establishment
and management of the Telecentre and as a result project heroes were identified
and incorporated by the donors. This type of community involvement corresponds
with, and contributes to the achievement of the social goal of donor-funded
telecentres, namely to address the needs of the community, and to undertake
actions based on the use of ICTs to improve the quality of life of the population.
• Finally, the study has also highlighted the fact that if project sustainability is to be
achieved, donors need to constantly improve the training and management
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component oftelecentres. The study has shown that the training of operators, both
at Nakaseke and Bhamshela Telecentres, was essential not only for the general
management of the Telecentres but also for the transfer of knowledge and
information to the community. Similarly, the training of users was also necessary
to ensure the effective appropriation of that knowledge and the purposeful use of
technologies such as the Internet. In fact, the relative success of Nakaseke
Telecentre has shown that telecentres can play a key role in promoting the use of
the Internet, and in allowing the community to benefit fully from the electronic
exchange of ideas, experiences, knowledge or technology, that can be applied to
their daily activities.
5.4 Concluding remarks
The overall conclusion for this study is that the potential for institutional development of
donor-funded telecentres exists in Africa. Evidence from the literature and from the data
collected for this study, shows that telecentre management is also improving at
community, government and donor levels by way of policy formulation, planning,
management, evaluation and monitoring. Despite the noted progress, the study has
revealed that donor-funded telecentres remain fragile across the continent. Funding
remains the main Achilles' heel as evidenced by the non-implementation of the MRTP
case. Aftcr a decade of donor-funded telecentre experimentation in Africa, this study
submits that time has come for the consolidation of appropriate implementation
strategies. However, this cannot take place without sustainable funding. The sole reliance
on external donors is not a long-term solution for the continent. As Africans, we need to
"jump out of the box" and use the resources that we have at our disposal. Thus, a
thorough evaluation of all potential domestic funding sources and mechanisms might be
one option. However, this will require an unshakeable resolve, strong political leadership
and an aggressive resource mobilization.
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5.5 Recommendations
Experience gained from the examination of the three case studies and pointers from the
literature, allowed the researcher to make the following recommendations to those who
wish to fund telecentres in Africa:
• The development of open and proactive donor policies is critical as they can make
telecentres avoid basic problems like those experienced by the Bhamshela and
MRTP cases. These policies can also inspire a considerable expansion of
telecentre services across Africa. However, donor policies need to drive this
expansion within a social accountability context and in awareness of the needs of
the deprived communities. In turn, there is a need for donor policies to stimulate
local demand, thereby reducing investment risk for telecentres in rural areas. This
could include, for example, enabling the potential of e-commerce for rural
producers to flourish (see Section 2.5.1.2).
• Another critical factor that has emerged from this study is the need for donors to
court the community at large and make them aware of the different benefits from
the telecentre services. Thus, identifying and training local champions who will
nurture the telecentre project in the long term can make or break the success of
such a service. It is advisable for donors to have local stakeholders from areas
such as health clinics, municipalities, political parties and teacher training
colleges. People from these institutions are most likely to become the core users
of the services and will most likely diffuse the technologies widely. As the study
has shown, communities will often be involved in providing rent-free facilities to
accommodate a telecentre or in building new ones (see Sections 1.7.1 and 1.7.2).
Thus, whether individuals, institutions or both, having champions will create the
initial impetus and support for the MeT and form an invaluable stakeholder group
and initial client base that no outsiders can ever achieve.
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• Based on data collected for this study, a range of important issues are linked to the
operation and success of telecentres. These include: community relevance,
government and donor policies, infrastructure, community partnerships and
participation and the scope of the telecentre objectives. However, donors need to
recognize that buildings constructed and the technology provided should not be a
measure of project success. Success must be measured by the project results
delivered to the telecentre users and the sustainability of the telecentre itself (see
Section 2.8.2). Donors should also note that an abrupt ending of donor assistance
is often detrimental to the sustainability of the project. Small financial support in a
transitional phase should, therefore, be viewed as a valuable way to phase out the
project. The most successful assistance instances are achieved when the project
continues to run smoothly after external funding has stopped. In other words, a
phasing out mechanism should be built-in when establishing (designing) the
project.
• Donors should also ensure that greater attention is given to the training and
management components of the project, as was the case at the Nakaseke
Telecentre. Thus, village seminars, workshops and training programmes for both
the user community and the telecentre personnel must be integrated in the
implementation strategy and should be followed up periodically. For example,
ongoing training will be necessary for the users of the telecentres and periodical
training will be required on an as-needed basis to upgrade staff skills as the
technology and content requirements change. Moreover, rural colleges and
schools, as well as extension services, can use telecentres for professional
training, and as a facility for distance learning and for farmer tele-training. Thus,
when designing training programmes, donors should consider the users'
requirements and learning preferences, which means that the content and method
of delivery should be developed in collaboration with the community. In addition,
training-of-trainers (for example, the telecentre staft) will be necessary to ensure
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that the training methods and the content of the training sessions conducted are
current and appropriate.
• The assessment of user needs and their translation into services and content was
probably a key consideration in determining the telecentre model the people of
Nakaseke wanted and therefore its relative success. The opposite was clearly the
case at Bhamshela (Section 4.4.4). It is important at the earliest stage, therefore, to
articulate the core service (that which is most critical to the community or will
most quickly attract users) and then structure the other services around it. Thus,
the study recommends that donors need to develop telecentre strategies and
investments for rural areas while taking into consideration differences in
languages, culture, socio-economic conditions and infrastructure. This should be
reflected in participatory needs assessment and the development of both the
telecentre itself and the forms taken by information content and linkages to more
conventional communication media such as radio.
• It is clear from this study that "telecentres and other grassroots technology
initiatives can only scale up through partnership," (Roman and Colle 2000: 35).
This study has shown that partnerships will offer two things to grassroots
telecentre networks: social investments and support services. Social investments
include funding the development of the telecentre network, workshops, training
programs, online information sharing services, and innovative new community
services (see Sections 1.7.] and 1.7.2). Support services include business
planning, which was conspicuously lacking in all the three cases, facilitation, and
an online community platform, all of which are designed to help telecentre
networks succeed quickly. Strategic partnerships can also facilitate networking,
content creation, applications and the mobilization of users.
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5.6 Suggestions for further research
This study makes three recommendations for further research:
• Research is clearly needed to assess how countries In Africa are improving
telecentre policies and regulations and whether they are achieving success in
expanding telecentre initiatives in rural areas. While the literature provides some
broad indicators, serious discussion on what is required to overcome obstacles to
policy and regulatory improvement is limited. The importance of this discussion
cannot be stressed enough: available tactical knowledge must be shared more
widely than it is today. Just as research is needed from the perspective of the
policy makers and telecentre donors, information is also required from the private
sector telecentre operators. Understanding how private sector telecentre operators
are able to work with cumbersome national regulators to successfully start new
operations or expand existing ones is crucial if more prospective donors are to
enter the market and invest in rural telecentre initiatives.
• There is need for research into the impact of telecentres on rural African societies
and cultures. African societies are rich in traditional cultures that date back many
centuries. Though these societies have evolved and continue to evolve in response
to the changes occurring around them, they are still able to maintain their own
unique cultures, characteristics, individualities and originality. The introduction
of telecentres in rural Africa is bound to affect the way in which these rural
communities operate. Consequently, more research needs to be done to better
understand the impact that telecentres will have on traditional rural African
society and culture.
• Research is also required to identify effective approaches to tclecentre awareness
building at the local level. Local people should be made aware of what these new
and effective leTs can provide for them in terms of information and
communication cost savings; having greater access to information sources; and
enabling the contribution of local knowledge to the wider global community via
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the Internet. However, there is no technology template available with which to
provide a "one size fits all" approach to telecentres. People from different
cultural backgrounds will not necessarily accept the same methods and
approaches taken in introducing telecentres, nor will these initiatives produce the
same results. Issues such as the choice of language used to convey information to
rural people become key in determining the extent to which rural African people
will accept and adapt to the ICTs, which are provided to them via telecentres.
Therefore, more research is required to identify the most appropriate means and
approaches of making the diverse peoples in rural and remote parts of Africa
aware of telecentres, the possibilities that such initiatives offer them through
increased access to information, and the impact that the ICT applications found in
telecentres can have on their lives.
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Covering letter of questionnaire to gather information on the role of donors in the
establishment, implementation and sustainability telecentres in Africa
Dear respondent,
I am a student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal on the Pietermaritzburg Campus. I am
seeking your assistance in my research project, which is being done in partial fulfilment
of my Masters in Information Studies (MIS) degree. The aim of this study is to determine
the role of donors in telecentre projects in Africa by looking at the success factors and
reasons for failures (if any) of three donor funded telecentre projects in Africa. The
telecentre projects in question are: Nakaseke in Uganda, Bhamshela in South Africa and
the Malawi Rural Telecentre Project (MRTP), which failed to materialise. You have been
identified as someone who could contribute to the study as your organisation funded one
or two of the three projects mentioned above.








To Whom It May Concern
Re: Assistance with research project
Ken Denllis Chisa (Student number 200270479) is registered for his
Master of Information Studies (MIS) degree with the Information Studies
Programme, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg. He is presently
completing the short dissertation component of the degree.
Ken is researching the role of donors in various telecentre projects in Africa
and in doing so he is interviewing various role players including both .> ,
government and donor agency officials. I would be most grateful if you
could support Ken in his research by allowing him to interview you.
We do believe that Ken's research will be of interest and use to those
involved in telecentre initiatives on the continent and elsewhere. Your
cooperation would thus be much appreciated. If you have any queries I can
be contacted either by phone or by etnail:




(MIS Programme Coordinator and Supervisor)
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APPENDIXC
Questionnaire for collecting data on the role of donors in three
telecentre projects in Africa
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE
a. Please answer the questions from the perspective of the donor organization
you represent.
b. Please try to be as objective as possible.
c. Please use the spaces provided to record your answers.
1 Project establishment
1.1 Please name the project your organization was involved in. (If your organization was
involved in more than one of the projects please base your answers below on the project
which necessitated the most involvement).
1.2 What is your organization's present policy towards the establishment of telecentre
projects in Africa?
1.3 Was this policy different in the past (in what way?) and is it likely to change in the
future?
2 Project implementation
2.1 What were the main implementation arrangements put in place for the telecentre
project? (e.g. scope needs analysis, site identification, consultation with stakeholders etc).
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2.2 What main lessons have emerged from the project in terms of implementation that
could be useful for similar projects in Africa?
3 Strategic partnerships
3.1 Who were the key stakeholders involved in the project?
3.2 What approaches were used to promote the collaboration of these different
stakeholders under the project?
3.3 How were elements to ensure project ownership (if any) integrated into the design of
the project?
3.4 What main lessons have emerged from this project in terms of project ownership and
collaboration that could be applicable to similar projects in Africa?
4 Sustainability
4.1 What were the key steps actually taken to help ensure sustainability of project
outcomes (e.g. managerial skills training, entrepreneurship etc)?
4.2 How would you rate the progress of the project presently In terms of its
sustainability? Please elaborate.
4.3 What main lessons have emerged from the project with regard to tclcccntre
sustainability that could be useful for similar projects in Africa?
5 Monitoring and evaluation
5.1 What monitoring and evaluation arrangements were planned and implemented as part
of the project?
5.2 What main lessons have emerged from the project In terms of monitoring and
evaluation that could be applicable to similar projects in Africa?
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6 General
6.1 Any other issue you would like to add concerning what has been said?
6.2 Could you direct me to other individuals who might wish to answer these questions
and give me their input?
Many thanks for taking the time to answer these questions. If you would like an
electronic copy of my study once it is completed please indicate so.
Contact details:
Ken Chisa (Student number 200270479)
Information Studies Programme
SASS








An interview schedule for collecting data on the role
of donors in three telecentre projects in Africa
1. Could you please describe your organisation's role in the MRTP?
2. What were the main issues that prevented the implementation of the MRTP?
3. What main lessons have emerged from the project in terms of donor participation
that could be applicable to similar projects in the continent?
4. Any other issue you would like to add concerning what has been discussed?
Many thanks for taking the time to answer these questions. You are welcome to have
an electronic copy of my study once it is completed.
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APPENDIXE
QUESTIONS ASKED TO LOCAL
ROLE PLAYERS OF THE MRTP
1. To what extent were you involved in decisions on different aspects of the Malawi
Rural Telecentre Project especially with regard to:
a. The planning and establishment of the project?
b. Implementation of the project?
2. What were the main factors that prevented the implementation of the MRTP?
3. What main lessons have emerged from the project in terms of donor participation that
could be applicable to similar projects in the continent?
4. Any other issue you would like to add concerning what has been discussed?
Many thanks for taking the time to answer these questions. You are welcome to have
an electronic copy of my study once it is completed.
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2006/01/11 11 :34:43 AM
RE: Maslers questionnaire




From: Ken Chlsa [mallto:200270479@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: Thursday, January 05,200610:15 AM
fo: Kllosl Mahlangu
Subject: RE: Masters questionnaire
::;ompllments of the new yearll May you kindly advise whether'l should
Jtllllook forward to your response to the questionnaire. Its Just that
Ime Is no longer on my side and and If you are not In a position to
mswer the questionnaire please Inform me so that I can make the
lecessary adjustments to the research While I stili have the time.
'Varmest regards
(en Chlsa
.» "Khos! Mahlangu" <::khoslm@usa.org.za> 11/23/05 12:43 PM »>
'handl sent me a message but not the questionnaire I will look at It
iOd




rom: Ken Chlsa [mallto:200270479@ukzn.ac.za]




Mould like to confirm whether you are In receipt of a Masters
Bsearch questionnaire from me forwarded 10 you by Miss Thandl
Ibakwane. If you are madam, could 1be kindly assured of a response?
lur earllesl convenience?
nd regards,
m Chlsa.
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